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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 The aim of this work is to study the efficiency of the benchmarks used in the 
asset management industry. 
 The capitalization weighted indexes are by far the most common indexes used as 
a benchmark for active and passive investments. As assessed by Arnott et al. (2005), 
capitalization weighting has many benefits: 
1) Capitalization weighting is a passive strategy requiring little trading; therefore, 
indexing to a cap-weighted index incurs far lower trading costs and fees than 
active management. Cap-weighted portfolios automatically rebalance as security 
prices fluctuate. Apart from the impact of stock buybacks and secondary equity 
offering, the only rebalancing cost associated with executing this strategy is the 
cost of replacing a constituent security in the portfolio. The cap-weighted 
indexes require material adjustment only when new companies become large 
enough to merit inclusion in an index or when others disappear trough merger, 
failure, or relative changes in capitalization, collectively referred to as 
“reconstruction”. 
2) A cap-weighted index provides a convenient way to participate in a broad equity 
market. Capitalization weighting seeks to assign the greatest weights to the large 
companies. These companies are typically among the largest as also measured 
by metrics of size other than capitalization. 
3) Market capitalization is highly correlated with trading liquidity, so cap 
weighting tends to emphasize the more heavily traded stocks, thereby reducing 
portfolio transaction costs. 
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4) Because market capitalization is also highly correlated with investment capacity, 
cap weightings tends to emphasize the stocks with greater investment capacity, 
thus allowing the use of passive indexing on an immense scale by large pension 
funds and institutions. 
 Arnott et al. (2005) and Hsu (2004) point out also that under a “standard” 
interpretation of the Capital Asset Pricing Model a broad-based cap-weighted portfolio 
(a “market” portfolio) is automatically Sharpe Ratio maximized (or mean-variance 
optimality). That is why a huge amount of passive equity investments are done using a 
cap-weighted index as a benchmark. 
 As Hsu (2004) says, if equity prices are more volatile than warranted by changes 
in firm value, a stock is either too expensive or too cheap relative to its fundamental 
value. If stocks prices are inefficient in the sense that they do not fully reflect firm 
fundamentals, then under-priced stocks will have a smaller capitalization than their fair 
value and similarly over-priced stocks will have a larger capitalization than their fair 
value. A cap-weighted portfolio would have on average shift additional weights into the 
over-priced stocks and shift weights away from the under-priced stocks. As long as 
these pricing errors are not persistent, market prices will collapse toward fair value over 
time and a cap-weighted portfolio would tend to experience greater price decline than 
other non-price-weighted portfolios due to its heavier exposure to stocks with positive 
pricing error. 
 The noisy stock price assumption of Hsu (2004) suggests that stock returns are 
serially negatively correlated, which imply mean reversion. 
 Perold (2007) points out that noisy market hypothesis effectively anchors on fair 
value. To do so is to presuppose systematic reversals in stock prices, an assertion that 
does not follow from stocks being randomly mispriced. Because market capitalization 
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does not reveal whether a stock is overvalued or undervalued, the random mispricing of 
stocks does not systematically shift the portfolio weights toward overvalued stocks. 
 The real debate, then, is whether one subscribes to the efficient market 
hypothesis or the noise-in-price hypothesis. The former suggests that valuation-
indifferent weightings is mean-variance superior to cap-weighting because it takes on 
non-Gaussian hidden risks that are correlated with small-cap and value exposure. The 
latter remains controversial because it suggests a financial market free lunch. 
 As a consequence of the idea of Arnott et al. (2005) and Hsu (2004) that a cap-
weighted index is not a mean-variance optimal portfolio in the last years we had an 
impressive development of new indexes with the idea to have a better benchmark for 
passive investments. 
 Following Perold (2007) and Siegel (2003) we must first remember that 
capitalization weighting is the only strategy that all investors can follow. Because the 
collective holdings of investors (by definition) aggregate to the market portfolio, for 
every investor who is underweight a stock, another is overweight that stock, and 
between them, it is at best a zero-sum game. So many new indexes are seeking to 
position an active management strategy in a passive management framework. 
 Chow et al. (2011) give a good framework of alternative approaches to passive 
equity investing which claiming to offer risk-adjusted performance superior to that of 
traditional market-capitalization-weighted indices. 
 The strategies can be classified into two categories: (1) heuristic-based-
weighting methodologies and (2) optimization-based-methodologies. Heuristic-based 
strategies are ad hoc weighting schemes established on simple and, arguably, sensible 
rules. Optimization-based strategies are predicated on an exercise to maximize the 
portfolio’s ex ante Sharpe ratio, subject to practical investment constraints. 
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Heuristic-Based Weighting Strategies: 
1) Equally weighting. In an equal-weighted portfolio, constituents are selected from 
the largest N = 1,000 stocks sorted by descending market capitalization on the 
reconstitution date. The weight of each stock is set to 1/N. A notable feature of 
equal weighting is that the resulting portfolio risk-return characteristics are 
highly sensitive to the number of included stocks. 
2) Risk-cluster equal weighting. The method improves upon the simple equal-
weighted scheme by equally weighting risk clusters instead of individual stocks. 
The advantage over simple equal weighting is the robustness of the resulting 
portfolio to the size of the chosen stock universe. 
3) Diversity weighting. Two other potential concerns with equal weighting are 
relatively high tracking error against the cap-weighted benchmark and excess 
portfolio turnover. A simple solution is to blend portfolios on the basis of equal 
weighting and cap weighting in order to attenuate the levels of tracking error and 
turnover. Intuitively, diversity weighting can be viewed as a method for 
interpolating between cap weighting and equally weighting. Generally, this 
process redistributes weights from the larger names in the cap-weighted 
portfolio to the smaller names. 
4) Fundamental weighting. Arnott et al. (2005) described a methodology for 
weighting stock indices by constituent companies’ accounting size, measured by 
such reported financial variables as total sales and book value. Their aim was to 
propose weighting measures that are uncorrelated with the companies’ market 
valuations. They argued that weighting by accounting-based measures of size 
improves upon equal weighting by reducing relative tracking error against the 
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cap-weighted index and turnover while enhancing portfolio liquidity and 
capacity from equally weighting. 
 
Optimization-Based Weighting Strategies: 
 In theory, mean-variance optimization is a fantastic way to form passive 
portfolios, yet it frequently falls short of its targets when applied in practice. The two 
inputs required to generate an optimal mean-variance portfolio (all the stocks’ expected 
returns and their covariance matrix) are notoriously difficult to estimate. 
1) Minimum-variance strategies. Because forecasting returns is so difficult and the 
potential for error so large, Chopra and Ziemba (1993) suggested that portfolio 
outcomes could be improved by assuming that all stocks have the same expected 
returns. Under this seemingly stark assumption, the optimal portfolio is the 
minimum-variance portfolio. 
2) Maximum Sharpe ratio I. To improve upon a minimum-variance strategy, 
investors need to incorporate useful information on future stock returns. 
Choueifaty and Coignard (2008) proposed a simple linear relationship between 
the expected premium for a stock and its return volatility. That represents a 
departure from standard finance theory, which states that only the no 
diversifiable component of volatility (systematic risk) should earn a premium. 
When applied to stocks and portfolios of stocks it becomes internally 
inconsistent; it suggests that all stocks and portfolios should have the same 
Sharpe ratio and, therefore, that volatilities are linearly additive in equilibrium, 
which cannot be correct. 
3) Maximum Sharpe ratio II. Amenc et al. (2010) developed a related portfolio 
approach that assumes a stock’s expected returns are linearly related to its 
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downside semi-volatility. They argued that investors are more concerned with 
portfolio losses than with gains. Thus, risk premium should be related to 
downside risk (semi-deviation below zero) as opposed to volatility. This 
assumption serves as a foundation for the EDHEC-Risk Efficient Equity 
Indeces. Amenc et al. (2010) used a two-stage estimation heuristic to estimate 
the semi-volatility of stocks. Under their method, one first computes empirical 
semi-volatilities and sort stocks by these estimates into deciles; then one sets the 
semi-volatility of stocks in the same decile equal to the median value of the 
containing decile. 
 While a lot of work has done for the equity indexes used as benchmarks for 
equity investments, less has done for bond indexes. 
 Arnott et al. (2010) used a similar approach as the fundamental indexation of 
equity indexes to U.S. investment-grade corporate bonds, U.S. high-yield bonds, and 
hard-currency emerging market bonds. For the first two markets they use they use five 
factors to construct the weightings: total cash flow, total dividends, book value of assets, 
sales, and face value of the debt issue. For the emerging market bonds they use: total 
population, square root of land area (as a crude proxy for land resources), total gross 
domestic product (GDP), and energy consumption. 
The contribution of this work to the literature is as follow: 
1) In chapter 2 it is presented a study on the efficiency of Government Bond 
Indexes, where it is analyzed the equally weighting and GDP weighting systems 
for country weights. 
2) In chapter 3 it is presented a study on the use of a derivatives index to invest in 
the European corporate bond market and its differences with the cash index. 
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3) In chapter 4 it is analyzed the impact of fallen angels on the corporate bond 
portfolios, with the rules of the benchmark indexes which can determine a loss 
of value for the investors. 
4) In chapter 5 it is presented a comparison between the equally weighted and 
capitalization weighted method for the European equity market, with an analysis 
of the best rebalancing frequency and of the alpha after adjusting for the value 
and size factors. 
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Chapter 2: On the Efficiency of Government 
Bond Market Indexes for Eurozone and 
Emerging Markets 
 
Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to understand if there are alternative indexes to use as a 
benchmark for the Government bond markets. 
 The most used benchmarks are the capitalization weighted indexes, where each 
bond is weighted by its market value, and the weight of each country is the result of the 
sum of the market value of the bonds issued by the country. 
 There are two problems arising: 
1. A low diversification of the issuer risk, in case some large countries have a high 
weight in the index. In fact, if something happens to a large country, such as an 
external shock or an economic crisis, investors will have a heavy impact on their 
investments. 
2. If a country is highly indebted, it will have a weight in the index higher than the 
economic relevance of the country, while a low indebted country will have a 
lower weight in the index. That is a problem because we usually have a positive 
correlation between a high debt level and the default risk. 
  These problems are well analyzed by Arnott et al. (2010) and Siegel (2003). 
 A possible answer to the diversification problem is to use an equally weight 
method for the country weights. In this case we have a higher diversification of the 
country risk. 
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Another way is to use a diversified index such as the one constructed by JPM for the 
Emerging Market Bond Index. This way, the weight of a bigger issuer is reduced and 
the weight of a smaller issuer is increased in order to raise the diversification. 
 To solve the problem of high indebted countries, Arnott et al. [2010] suggests 
using alternative weights rather than the capitalization weights. GDP, population, land 
area and energy consumption are used as proxies of the country economic relevance and 
these values are taken to construct the index weights. 
 It is important to point out that these two problems are related to the default risk 
of a country, not to the currency risk of investing in a bond issued in a specific currency. 
 This is important because in case a country faces some difficulties in managing 
its debt it has four options at its disposal, which are the following: 
1. Financial austerity, in order to improve its balance sheet and restore confidence 
in the market, the one that can pay back its debt. 
2. Monetization of debt, with the Central Bank buying the debt and increasing the 
money supply. The consequences can be a higher inflation and the risk of a 
currency crisis if there is a lack of confidence in the currency. 
3. Upload of captive investors with the bond supply absorbed by those investors 
who have restrictions and have no other choice than buying these bonds. In this 
case captive investors’ bear a loss because, on their investments, they earn an 
interest rate lower than the market interest rate.  
4. Default or debt restructuring. 
 If a country chooses option 2), it can avoid a default or a restructuring of the 
debt but a foreign investor will incur a loss due to the currency devaluation. 
 If the debt is in a foreign currency option 2) is not available, because the Central 
Bank cannot increase the money supply and has no access to the printing machine. 
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 In case of a debt in a foreign currency the default risk of a country is very 
important and the two problems, namely low diversification of the issuer risk and the 
weight of highly indebted country are particularly relevant. 
 Therefore, we restrict our analysis to two kinds of government markets, the 
emerging market bonds issued in US dollars and the Eurozone Government bond 
market, in which countries do not have the option of monetizing their debts. 
 For these two markets, we analyze four kinds of indexes: 
1. A capitalization weighted index, by far the most common kind of benchmark for 
these markets. 
2. A country equally weighted index, in order to maximize the diversification of 
default risk. 
3. A diversified index, where the weights are constructed in order to reduce the 
weights of the bigger issuers and to increase the diversification. 
4. A GDP weighted index, in order to avoid the problem of the high weights of 
high indebted countries and in order to use weights more related to the economic 
size of a country. 
 At first, we explain in detail the data and the methodology we use to construct 
the four indexes referred to the two markets we take into consideration. 
 Subsequently, we analyze the results in terms of total return, volatility and 
Sharpe ratio of the indexes, using different sub periods in order to understand if the 
behavior of the indexes changes in different market conditions. 
 Finally, we make our conclusions on which index is more efficient as a 
benchmark for the two markets.  
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Data and Methodology 
 For our analysis, we start with two widely used capitalization weighted indexes 
for the two markets, the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Euro Government Bond Index 
(Bloomberg ticker EG00, as follows ML) and the JPM Emerging Market Bond Index 
Global (Bloomberg ticker JPEGSOSD, hereinafter EMBIG). 
We use Bloomberg to collect all our data. 
 The EMBIG includes the US dollar-denominated Brady bonds, the Eurobonds, 
and traded loans issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities. The EMBIG defines 
emerging markets countries with a combination of World Bank-defined per capita 
income brackets and each country’s debt restructuring history. These two criteria allow 
the EMBIG to include a number of higher-rated countries that international investors 
have nevertheless considered part of the emerging market universe. 
 While the EMBIG index uses a traditional market capitalization approach to 
determine the weight of each individual issue, as well as the resulting country index 
allocation, the JPM one also calculates a diversified index (EMBIGD) for the emerging 
market bonds in US dollars, which distribute country weights more evenly. The 
EMBIGD limits the weights of those index countries with larger debt stocks by 
including only a specified portion of these countries’ eligible current face amounts of 
debt outstanding. 
 The calculation process of the EMBIGD bond allocation starts with each 
EMBIG country current face amount of debt outstanding, for each the EMBIGD 
includes: 
1. 100% of the first US$5 billion of the eligible debt stock. 
2. 75% of the eligible debt stock that exceeds US$5 billion, but does not exceed 
US$10 billion. 
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3. 50% of the eligible debt stock that exceeds US$10 billion, but does not exceed 
US$15 billion. 
4. 25% of the eligible debt stock that exceeds US$15 billion, but does not exceed 
US$25 billion. 
5. 10% of the eligible debt stock that exceeds US$25 billion, but does not exceed 
US$35 billion. 
6. 0% of the eligible debt stock that exceeds US$35 billion. 
 While both the EMBIG and the EMBIGD always contain the same list of debt 
instruments, the constraining process of the EMBIGD instrument allocation generates 
instruments and country weights, which are different than those of the EMBIG. 
 Countries with large current face amounts outstanding of the index-eligible debt 
will have their EMBIGD instrument allocations and, thus, index market capitalization 
weights are reduced (relative to the EMBIG) by the allocation-constrain process 
described above. Conversely, countries with relatively small current face amounts 
outstanding of total eligible debt will have a larger market capitalization weight in the 
EMBIGD than in the EMBIG, as their instruments allocation will not be reduced as 
much by this process. 
 We construct a GDP weighted index for both markets using, for each country, 
the GDP weight of the previous year. Annual GDP data are usually available in April, 
therefore, starting from the month of May we have a new GDP weight updating the 
data. GDP is nominal in current price and in US dollars, in order to have a value which 
best represents the current economic size of the country. For each month, we take the 
list of countries included in the EMBIG and calculate their respective GDP’s weights. 
We use the JPM country sub-indexes total return and with the GDP’s weights we have 
the monthly total return of our index. Starting from the monthly total return time series 
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we can construct an index GDP weighted. Finally, an equally weighted index for the 
emerging markets is constructed using the weight 1/n, where n is the number of 
countries included in the index for a certain month. 
 For the Eurozone government bond market, we use the Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch Euro Government Index which tracks the performance of euro denominated 
sovereign debt publicly issued by Euro member countries on either the Eurobond 
market or the issuer’s own domestic market. Qualifying countries should be Euro 
members and should have an investment grade foreign currency long-term sovereign 
debt rating, which is based on an average of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. Qualification 
with respect to Euro membership is determined annually effective as of December 31. 
As for the EMBIGD, we construct a diversified index for the Eurozone market with the 
following rules for each country: 
1. The weight up to 5% is fully included in the index. 
2. The weight between 5% and 10% is included in the index with a cut of 25%. 
3. The weight between 10% and 15% is included in the index with a cut of 75%. 
4. The weight over 15% is excluded from the index. 
5. Finally the weights as rebalanced in order to have a sum of 100% for all the 
countries. 
If we change the rules, we can have a higher/lower diversification, but this does not 
change the final results considering that our aim is to understand whether or not this 
diversification improves the risk/return profile of the index. 
 We construct a GDP weighted index for both markets using their respective 
GDP weight of the previous year. Annual GDP data are usually available in April; 
therefore, starting from the month of May we have a new GDP weight which updates 
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the data. GDP is nominal in current price and in Euro currency in order to have a value 
which best represents the current economic size of the country. 
 For each month, we take the list of countries included in the ML and calculate 
their respective GDP’s weights. We use the ML’s country sub-indexes total return and 
with the GDP’s weights we have the monthly total return of our index. Starting from the 
monthly total return time series we can construct an index GDP weighted. Finally, an 
equally weighted index for the Eurozone market is constructed using the weight 1/n 
where n is the number of countries included in the index for a certain month. 
 For the emerging markets, historical data are available from 1/1/1994 to 
12/31/2011 because JPM data are available only since 1994; for the Eurozone market 
they are available from 1/1/1999 to 12/31/2011 because the Euro was introduced in 
1999. We have four indexes for each market, namely the traditional capitalization 
weighted index, the diversified index, and the GDP weighted index and the equally 
weighted index. We analyze the logarithmic monthly returns, the standard deviation of 
the returns, the skewness, the excess returns on the risk free and the Sharpe ratio of the 
different indexes. As a risk free, we take the 1 month Euro Libor  for the Euro market 
and the 1 month US$ Libor for the emerging market. 
 We also analyze two sub-periods for each market. For the emerging markets we 
have a first sub-period starting 01/1994 and ending 12/2002 where the spreads of the 
market over the risk free US Treasury Bond was volatile and not falling, and a sub-
period starting 01/2003 and ending 12/2011 with a sharp reduction in the spread, and so 
therefore, a bull market for emerging market bonds. For the Eurozone market we have a 
first sub-period starting 01/1999 and ending 12/2007 with a stable spread between the 
German Bund and other countries bonds, and a sub-period starting 01/2008 and ending 
12/2011 with a sharp increase in the spread within Eurozone countries. 
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 Finally, we verify if the relative performance of the different indexes is 
significantly impacted by the different sub-periods running a regression with a dummy 
for the two different regimes. 
 
Results 
 The results for the emerging markets are detailed in exhibit no. 1, and for the 
entire period of time we can state the following: 
1. The equally weighted index (EW) has the highest excess return, but a higher 
standard deviation than the EMBIG. 
2. The GDP weighted index (GDP) has the lowest standard deviation, but a lower 
excess return than the EMBIG. 
3. The EW and the GDP indexes have the same Sharpe ratio, which is higher than 
the EMBIG one. 
4. The EMBIGD has a higher Sharpe ratio than the EMBIG because has a slightly 
higher excess return and a lower volatility, but its Sharpe ratio is lower than the 
EW and the GDP ones. 
    < insert Exhibit 1 here > 
 We can conclude that if we wish to minimize the risk, the GDP weighted index 
is the best one to be used, while the EW index is best suited to maximize the excess 
return. 
 If we take into consideration the two sub-periods from 1994 to 2002 with 
volatile spreads, and from 2003 to 2011 with falling spreads, we come to different 
conclusions: 
1. For the 1994-2002 sub-periods, the EMBIG performance is disappointing, with 
the lowest excess return and the highest standard deviation of the four indexes, 
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and the EW index is the best one as far as the excess return and Sharpe ratio are 
concerned. 
2. For the 2003-2011 sub-periods the EMBIG shows the best performance in terms 
of excess return and Sharpe ratio. Therefore, we can affirm that the 
capitalization weighted EMBIG is the worst index during volatile markets but 
the best one when markets arise like in the second sub-period. 
 The outcome does not come as a surprise. In fact, a capitalization weighted 
index usually has a higher weight in highly indebted countries, which are more risky, 
and this characteristic pays higher returns when the market performs well and risk is 
rewarded. When the market is volatile or when the spreads trend is higher, a 
capitalization weighted index can incur in higher losses. 
 For the Eurozone market, we reach different results (exhibit no. 2): 
1. The GDP weighted index has the highest excess return and the highest Sharpe 
ratio. 
2. The EW index has the lowest excess return and lowest Sharpe ratio. 
3. The standard deviation is similar between the indexes, and the excess return 
explains the differences between Sharpe ratios. 
    < insert Exhibit 2 here > 
 When we analyze the two sub-periods from 1999 to 2007 with stable and low 
spreads and from 2008 to 2011 with increasing spread of the countries, we come to the 
following conclusions: 
1. In the first period the behavior of the indexes is very similar, with no differences 
in excess returns and standard deviations. 
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2. In the second period of rising spreads the GDP weighted index has a higher 
excess return and a higher Sharpe ratio, while the EW index has a lower excess 
return and a lower Sharpe ratio. 
For the Eurozone market, the index weighting system is not important during stable 
years, but in times of economic crises, such as the one that started in 2008 the GDP 
weighted is clearly the best one because it avoids the problem of the high weights of 
high indebted countries and uses weights more related to the economic size of a 
country. There is no evidence of the benefits from diversification arising from the EW 
index. 
 Subsequently, we run a series of regressions to understand if it is statistically 
significant to divide the time series in two different periods. For the Emerging 
Markets, we use a dummy with value zero from 1994 to 2002 and with value one from 
2003 to 2011. We run regressions with the excess return on the risk free for the different 
indexes as a dependent variable, and the excess return on the risk free of the EMBIG 
and Dummy as independent variables. 
 The results of the three regressions are detailed in exhibit no.3 (GDP index), no. 
4 (EW index) and no. 5 (EMBIGD index). The p-values for the dummy are between 
0.10 and 0.16, therefore, we cannot assert that it is statistically significant to divide the 
time period in two sub-periods. 
    < insert Exhibit 3 here > 
    < insert Exhibit 4 here > 
    < insert Exhibit 5 here > 
 For the Eurozone Market we do the same, and we use a dummy with value zero 
from 1999 to 2007 and with value one from 2008 to 2011. 
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 We run regressions with the excess return on the risk free of the different 
indexes as a dependent variable, and the excess return on the risk free of the ML index 
and Dummy as independent variables. 
 The results of the three regressions are detailed in exhibit no. 6 (GDP index), no. 
7 (EW index) and no. 8 (DIVERSIFIED index). The p-values for the dummy are 
significant at 99% for the GDP index and at 90% for the EW and the Diversified 
indexes, thus, we can affirm that it is statistically significant to separate the time period 
into two sub-periods. 
    < insert Exhibit 6 here > 
    < insert Exhibit 7 here > 
    < insert Exhibit 8 here > 
 
Conclusions 
 For the Emerging Market Bonds we find that it is better to use an EW index than 
a capitalization weighted one in order to maximize the total return, while a GDP index 
is to be used when we wish to minimize volatility, and both have a higher Sharpe ratio 
than the capitalization weighted index. 
 If we divide our analysis into two sub-periods, we discover that the GDP index 
is always the best one in order to reduce volatility. However, it showed a lower total 
return during the bull market from 2003 to 2011, and during the entire period from 1994 
to 2011. In terms of Sharpe ratio the GDP index is superior to the capitalization index 
during the volatile markets from 1994 to 2002 and only slightly inferior during the bull 
market from 2003 to 2011. 
 For the EW index we find a large out-performance relative to the EMBIG 
capitalization index during the first period from 1994 to 2002, and a slight under-
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performance during the second period from 2003 to 2011. The first period is 
characterized by high volatility of the market due to the several economic crises 
occurred, i.e. the outright default for Russia, Ecuador and Argentina, debt restructuring 
under a coercive threat of default in Ukraine, Pakistan and Uruguay, large scale IMF 
financial support for Mexico, Brazil and Turkey. During that period of time, a high level 
of diversification of country risk like in the EW index was a key element of 
outperformance. The second period is characterized by a more stable environment and 
the EW index delivers a lower performance than the EMBIG. 
 We can conclude that the EMBIG is suited for investors who have a bullish view 
on the market, but in the long run the EW and the GDP weighted indexes are preferable 
as benchmarks. 
 The GDP index has a higher Sharpe ratio because has a lower volatility, and the 
EW index has a higher Sharpe ratio because has a higher total return during volatile 
markets. An investor can choose between the GDP if he/she wants a lower volatility and 
the EW index if he/she wishes to maximize the total return in the long run. 
 With regards to the liquidity and/or the capacity problem of the indexes, we can 
face some restrictions in the use of the EW and the GDP weighted indexes. Small 
countries or countries with a low amount of debt could find difficult to have a high 
proportion of a portfolio allocated to them or to have the portfolio rebalanced 
frequently. A large scale of passive investments in EW or GDP indexes could be 
problematic from a liquidity point of view. 
 These indexes can be used more widely as benchmarks by an active portfolio 
manager, who can select the countries in which to invest and then use an equally 
weighted method for the countries weights or can select the underweights and 
overweights related to a GDP index. 
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 The Diversified index has results in terms of Sharpe ratio and returns which are 
between the capitalization index and the GDP index, and a less important liquidity 
and/or capacity problem because it is only a deviation from the EMBIGD, therefore, it 
can be more easily used for a passive investment on the market. 
 For the Eurozone market we have different results. In fact, the GDP index is the 
best one in terms of total return and Sharpe ratio and the EW index is the worst one. 
 For such a market the diversification through an EW index is not effective in 
reducing volatility and during the economic crisis from 2008 to 2011 the total return is 
lower than the capitalization index. 
 Far more effective, it is to reduce the risk related to the high weights of highly 
indebted countries using a GDP index, which gives a higher total return and a slightly 
lower volatility during a period of economic crisis. 
 It is important to note that during the period of time prior to the economic crisis 
from 1999 to 2007 the various indexes have a very similar performance and volatility. It 
is only during the economic crisis that the diverse constructions lead to a better 
performance of the GDP index and a bad performance of an EW index. 
 We can conclude that a GDP index can be a better benchmark for an active 
portfolio manager because it is more efficient in the long run. As mentioned before, a 
GDP index has a liquidity or capacity problem because of the use of passive 
investments on a large scale. 
 To introduce the different results for the two markets we have studied, we can 
start from the different kind of economic crises that can happen, as described by 
Manasse and Roubini [2005]. 
 Debt crises can be classified into three types: 
1. Episodes of insolvency or debt unsustainability due to high debt and illiquidity. 
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2. Episodes of illiquidity, where near default is driven by large stocks of short term 
liabilities relative to foreign reserves. 
3. Episodes of macro and exchange rate weaknesses (large overvaluation and 
negative growth shocks). 
 Manasse and Roubini assert that low external debt is by no means a key element 
in order to avoid an economic crisis in emerging markets. 
 Their study shows that despite intermediate external debt level, the joint effect of 
short-term debt (exceeding 130 percent of reserves), relatively rigid exchange rates (low 
volatility) and political uncertainty, concur to raise the probability of an economic crises 
up to 41 percent. 
 Because of that, an EW method can work well for Emerging Markets 
investments. In fact, the level of debt is not sufficient to access the issuer risk, and 
maximum diversification is a good method to avoid idiosyncratic risks. 
 In the Eurozone, episodes of economic crisis for illiquidity are avoided through 
the intervention of other countries and of the European Central Bank. The problems are 
more related to debt unsustainability (point 1) and macro and exchange rate weaknesses 
(point 3). 
 As a consequence, for the Eurozone government bond market a careful look at 
the debt level using a GDP index is probably more effective than an EW index. 
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EXHIBIT 1- EMERGING MARKETS DATA 
 
1/1994-12/2011
EMBIG EMBIGD GDP EW
monthly performance 0,80% 0,82% 0,77% 0,90%
standard deviation 4,15% 3,95% 3,27% 4,05%
skweness -2,93 -3,03 -3,03 -2,88
excess return 0,53% 0,54% 0,49% 0,62%
sharpe ratio 0,13 0,14 0,15 0,15
total return 467 484 422 593
1/1994-12/2002
EMBIG EMBIGD GDP EW
monthly performance 0,75% 0,82% 0,83% 0,99%
standard deviation 5,22% 4,89% 4,05% 4,88%
skweness -2,60 -2,71 -2,85 -2,42
excess return 0,38% 0,44% 0,45% 0,61%
sharpe ratio 0,07 0,09 0,11 0,13
total return 125 142 144 190
1/2003-12/2011
EMBIG EMBIGD GDP EW
monthly performance 0,86% 0,82% 0,70% 0,81%
standard deviation 2,69% 2,73% 2,25% 3,03%
skweness -2,58 -3,01 -2,42 -4,02
excess return 0,68% 0,64% 0,53% 0,63%
sharpe ratio 0,25 0,24 0,24 0,21
total return 152 141 114 139  
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EXHIBIT 2- EUROZONE MARKET DATA 
 
1/1999-12/2011
ML EW GDP Diversified
monthly performance 0,36% 0,35% 0,37% 0,36%
standard deviation 1,10% 1,13% 1,09% 1,12%
skweness 0,10 -0,12 0,15 0,11
excess return 0,13% 0,11% 0,14% 0,12%
sharpe ratio 0,12 0,10 0,13 0,11
total return 72,96 68,57 77,05 71,96
1/1999-12/2007
ML EW GDP Diversified
monthly performance 0,35% 0,35% 0,35% 0,35%
standard deviation 0,92% 0,93% 0,92% 0,92%
skweness -0,24 -0,22 -0,24 -0,23
excess return 0,09% 0,09% 0,09% 0,09%
sharpe ratio 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,10
total return 45,41 46,00 45,21 45,57
1/2008-12/2011
ML EW GDP Diversified
monthly performance 0,36% 0,30% 0,41% 0,35%
standard deviation 1,44% 1,49% 1,41% 1,48%
skweness 0,31 -0,01 0,35 0,31
excess return 0,22% 0,16% 0,27% 0,20%
sharpe ratio 0,15 0,10 0,19 0,14
total return 16,24 12,75 19,15 15,44  
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EXHIBIT 3 – REGRESSION GDP-EMBIG 
 
OLS, 1994:01-2011:12 (T = 216) 
Variable: GDP 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.002 0.001 2.392 0.018 ** 
EMBIG 0.771 0.012 66.90 <0.000 *** 
Dummy -0.002 0.001 -1.645 0.101 
     
R-square 0.955    
 
 
EXHIBIT 4 – REGRESSION EW-EMBIG 
 
OLS, 1994:01-2011:12 (T = 216) 
Variable: EW 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.003 0.001 2.165 0.032 ** 
EMBIG 0.931 0.021 45.40 <0.000 *** 
Dummy -0.003 0.002 -1.544 0.124 
     
R-square 0.906    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
EXHIBIT 5 – REGRESSION EMBIGD-EMBIG 
 
OLS, 1994:01-2011:12 (T = 216) 
Variable: EMBIGD 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.001 0.000 1.908 0.058 * 
EMBIG 0.947 0.008 120.91 <0.000 *** 
Dummy -0.001 0.001 -1.408 0.161 
     
R-square 0.986    
 
 
EXHIBIT 6 – REGRESSION GDP-ML 
 
OLS, 1999:01-2011:12 (T = 156) 
Variable: GDP 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.000 0.000 -0.037 0.979  
ML 0.989 0.006 169.31 <0.000 *** 
Dummy -0.001 0.001 -1.408 0.000 *** 
     
R-square 0.995    
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EXHIBIT 7 – REGRESSION EW-ML 
 
OLS, 1999:01-2011:12 (T = 156) 
Variable: EW 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.000 0.000 0.168 0.867  
ML 1.007 0.014 69.98 <0.000 *** 
Dummy -0.001 0.000 -1.957 0.052 * 
     
R-square 0.970    
 
 
EXHIBIT 8 – REGRESSION DIVERSIFIED-ML 
 
OLS, 1999:01-2011:12 (T = 156) 
Variable: DIVERSIFIED 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.000 0.000 -0.058 0.954  
ML 1.015 0.004 245.97 <0.000 *** 
Dummy -0.000 0.000 -1.779 0.077 * 
     
R-square 0.997    
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Chapter 3: Alternative investments in the euro 
corporate bonds market: cash and CDS indexes 
 
Introduction 
 
 The aim of this chapter is to compare an index that is widely used as a benchmark 
for the euro corporate bond market – the Bank of America Merrill Lynch EMU 
Corporate Index (ML) – with an index used as a reference for the credit default swap 
(CDS) market, namely the Markit Itraxx Europe 5-year Index. 
 An investor can take exposure to the corporate bond market by choosing between 
single bonds in the cash market or CDS contracts of these issuers. The market for CDS 
indexes, where an index represents a position in a basket of single CDS contracts, has 
become very important in recent years, and is now a valid alternative to the cash market 
for institutional investors. 
 The Itraxx Europe 5-year Index is now the most popular and liquid index, with 
Markit giving a daily reference level and a total return index as well, measuring the 
performance of holding the respective on-the-run Itraxx Europe 5-year contract. The 
index reflects a long credit position, that is selling protection on the Itraxx Europe 
index. Therefore, it replicates the behavior of a fictitious portfolio that buys one Itraxx 
Europe contract and invests the notional remainder in money market instruments (Euro 
OverNight Index Average, EONIA). Each time a new Itraxx series is issued, due to a 
regular index roll (every year on 20th March and 20th September) or due to a default in 
the current series, the position in the reference portfolio is rolled into the on-the-run 
index position (the roll cost is 1% of the respective “old” series coupon plus 1% of the 
respective “new” series coupon). Any coupons paid are immediately reinvested. 
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 An exchange-traded fund (ETF) is now available that uses the Markit Total Return 
Index as a benchmark; therefore, retail investors can also use this index if they want to 
invest in the corporate bond market. Institutional investors also use the Itraxx Europe 
Index as a tool to hedge the credit risk in their portfolios, buying protection while 
holding a position in corporate bonds. 
 Given these two uses, the alternative ways of investing in the market and as a hedge 
tool for a portfolio, we think it is important to analyze in depth the different behaviors 
of the two indexes in order to understand the risks associated with either investment 
decision. 
 The academic literature on the differences between investing in cash bonds and 
CDSs only looks at the single firm level (Blanco et al. [2005] and Norden and Weber 
[2009] and not at the index level so our aim is to try to develop an analysis for the 
indexes. 
 We start by describing the data we used and the methodology for our analysis. 
After that, we compare the features of the two indexes and their consequent different 
exposures to risk factors such as duration, asset swap spread, sector weights and rating 
bucket weights. Then we analyze the risk/return profiles of the two indexes and the 
tracking error between them. We follow this with a time series analysis, and study the 
autocorrelation properties of the index series and the difference in the performance of 
the two indexes. We conclude by developing a risk factor analysis in order to 
understand which factors can best explain these differences in performance.   
 
Data and Methodology 
 For our analysis we choose two indexes that are widely used in the financial 
industry: the Bank of America Merril Lynch European Monetary Union Corporate 
 32 
Index (the ML Index, Bloomberg ticker ER00) and the Itraxx Europe Total Return 
Index (Bloomberg ticker ITRXTE5I). 
 We use monthly data starting with September 2006, the first month in which the 
Itraxx Europe Total Return Index is available, and ending with September 2011. We 
take the end of month value for each series. All data are collected from Bloomberg. 
 In order to compare these two investment options, that are the indexes, we need to 
adjust the Itraxx Europe Index and add the interest rate risk component to the credit risk 
component. Therefore, we create a new index called Derivatives which invests in the 
Itraxx Europe 5-year Total Return Index and at the same time in the Bobl (the German 
5-year government bond) on-the-run future contract (with a rollover every 3 months). 
 We perform a descriptive analysis of the two indexes showing their different 
characteristics and risk/return profiles. We use logarithmic data to calculate the monthly 
performance. To develop our time series analysis, we follow Reilly et al. [1992] to 
study the autocorrelation. We first use the Akaike criteria in order to choose the number 
of lags, so we run an autoregressive (AR) model to see whether autocorrelation exists 
and whether or not the prices follow a random walk. 
 Our second time series analysis consists of a vector autoregression (VAR) model to 
show a possible lead-lag relationship between the two indexes, as studied by Blanco et 
al. [2005] and Norden and Weber [2009] at the single firm level. We first perform the 
Engle-Granger test to find out whether there is cointegration and determine which 
model (ECM or VAR) to use for the analysis. We start off by using monthly data but, as 
it is well known that the dynamics between the bond cash market and the derivatives 
market are only relevant at a high data frequency, we also use daily data for the VAR 
model. 
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 Next, we use a regression model to understand which of the identified differences 
between the indexes are most relevant in determining the difference in performance. We 
perform a factor analysis, as in Fama and French [1993], using monthly data and the 
tracking error (TE, the difference in performance between the Derivatives index and the 
ML index) as a dependent variable. 
 
Features of the ML and Derivatives Indexes 
 The two indexes, ML and Itraxx Europe, are constructed using different rules, 
which are described in Exhibit 1. The main difference between the two indexes is the 
weighting method: the ML is capitalization-weighted and Itraxx is equally weighted. 
The capitalization weighting method assigns a weight to each bond depending on its 
market value. Thus, the weightings of different buckets of ratings, of sectors and of 
curve buckets are a consequence of the issues made by the companies. The Itraxx 
Europe has 125 members, much fewer than the approximately 1,700 in the ML, but with 
the equally weighted method the idiosyncratic risk is still low because the weights are 
limited to 0.8% for each member. 
<insert Exhibit 1 here > 
 Our aim is to compare an investment in the ML index with an investment in the 
Itraxx Europe and the Bobl future on-the-run Derivatives index. Thus, we look at the 
different exposures of these indexes to the main risk factors. Exhibit 2 shows the yield 
to maturity of the two indexes and in Exhibit 3 we show the trend in this measure. We 
can see that the ML has a higher mean value but also a higher volatility than the 
Derivatives index. 
< insert Exhibits 2 and 3 here > 
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 Next, we see that the indexes’ durations are quite similar (see Exhibits 4 and 5), 
but, also for this measure, in the ML case volatility is higher. The volatility of 
derivatives is due mainly to the quarterly roll of the Bobl future. 
< insert Exhibits 4 and 5 here > 
 The asset swap spreads of the two indexes are compared in Exhibits 6 and 7. The 
ML has a higher value, consistent with a higher yield to maturity, as well as a higher 
volatility of the value. 
< insert Exhibits 6 and 7 here > 
 The sector exposure of the two indexes is very different. For the ML this is a 
result of using the capitalization of the bonds outstanding, whereas the sector exposure 
is fixed by the index rules for the Itraxx. Exhibit 8 shows the differences for the main 
macro sectors, from which we can see that the biggest difference is in the weights for 
the financial sector, which are fixed at 20% for the Itraxx and vary between 52% and 
60% (with a mean value of 55%) for the ML. 
< insert Exhibit 8 here > 
 Exposure to the different ratings buckets is not fixed for either the ML or the 
Itraxx Index. Both have means close to A, as Exhibits 9 and 10 show. The scale used 
assigns 4 to BBB, 3 to A, 2 to AA and 1 to AAA, and the mean value is between 2.6 
and 2.9 for the ML Index and between 3.2 and 3.5 for the Itraxx Index so that the mean 
is higher for the ML but both are still closest to an A rating. We can conclude that the 
difference between the mean ratings of the two indexes is small but the ML Index has a 
slightly better rating on average. 
< insert Exhibits 9 and 10 here > 
 From our analysis we can state that the cap-weighted methodology used for the 
ML Index produces higher volatilities of the various risk exposure indicators (duration, 
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sector weights and mean ratings) than for the Derivatives Index. Companies issuing 
bonds might display opportunistic behavior in issuing long maturity bonds when the 
interest rates are low and short maturity bonds when interest rates are high. A cap-
weighted index that modifies its duration on the basis of the bonds issued could lead to 
a loss of value for investors if the opportunistic behavior of the issuers is profitable. 
Another problem related to the cap weighting methodology is the so-called ‘bums’ 
problem (Siegel [2003]), which is a result of a large share of the total debt market being 
made up of issuers with a large amount of outstanding debt, issuers whose 
creditworthiness and total debt volume are usually negatively related. The problem is 
not limited to individual issues; it can also occur if a specific segment is adversely 
affected. In the financial sector, for example, the sector weight for the ML Index had 
risen to 60% by the second half of 2008, just before the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
and the explosion of the financial bubble. As we can see in Exhibit 11, the financial 
sector weights started to decline from there and went down to 51% in December 2011.  
< insert Exhibit 11 here > 
 The effects of the cap-weighting methodology are well explained in Arnott et al. 
[2010]. The equal weighting methodology used for the Itraxx Index and the fixed sector 
weights rule allow this index to avoid the problem.   
 
Indexes’ Risk/Return Profiles 
 In order to compare the performances of the two alternative investment choices, we 
create time series for both portfolios, starting on 09/29/2006 and ending on 09/30/2011, 
one investing in the ML Index and the other in the Itraxx Europe Total Return Index and 
the Bobl future on-the-run. The Itraxx Europe Total Return Index is calculated by 
Markit and represents the payoff of a funded investment in the Itraxx Europe Index on-
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the-run. Over the 5-year period we find the total return for the ML to be 17.71%, and 
that for the Derivatives Index to be 19.62%, as Exhibit 12 shows. 
< insert Exhibit 12 here > 
 The monthly data are summarized in Exhibit 13, where the logarithmic values show 
an almost identical mean performance. When we compare the risk of the two indexes, 
we can see, however, that the ML has a higher standard deviation as well as more 
pronounced skewness and kurtosis. Therefore, it is more risky than the Derivatives 
Index. Finally, the Derivatives Index has a better Sharpe ratio due to its slightly higher 
performance (excess return over the risk free rate) and lower volatility. 
< insert Exhibit 13 here > 
 We calculate the tracking error (TE) between the two indexes in order to identify 
any short-run divergence in performance; the data are shown in Exhibit 14. The one-
month TE is 4% annualized, a high value considering the monthly annualized 
performance of 3.6% for the indexes. The TE is not only high, but also rises as we look 
at the values for 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 months using no overlapping data. This would be 
important for someone using index derivatives to hedge a bond portfolio because, due to 
the TE, they may incur losses over many months. 
< insert Exhibit 14 here > 
 
Time Series Analysis 
 In the previous section, we demonstrated the performance of the indexes, and now 
we analyze their time series. We follow Reilly et al. [1992] and study the 
autocorrelation in the time series because, if autocorrelation exists, it is an indication 
that prices do not follow a random walk pattern but the past performance has forecasting 
power for the future. Autocorrelation is estimated through an AR(3) model. If the 
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lagging variables are statistically significant, it means that there is autocorrelation in the 
series. The number of lags (3) is suggested by the Akaike criteria. Exhibit 15 shows the 
results for the Derivatives Index, where no autocorrelation is found and none of the 
lagging variables are statistically significant. 
< insert Exhibit 15 here > 
 In Exhibit 16 we can see that for the ML Index we have statistically significant 
autocorrelation for the lagging variables 1 and 3. Thus, the past performance of the 
index has forecasting power for the future. The presence of autocorrelation in the bond 
indexes is partially explained by the accrued component, which is constant over time, 
but the different results for the Derivatives and ML Indexes could indicate a stale 
pricing problem, too, where prices move with lags due to the bonds’ low liquidity, while 
the derivatives are a more liquid instrument. 
< insert Exhibit 16 here > 
 Exhibit 17 displays the results of an autocorrelation analysis concerning the 
difference in the performance of the two indexes (TE). We find a positive and 
statistically significant value for lag 1. This confirms our finding from earlier that the 
difference in performance between the two indexes tends to increase rather than 
converge in the short term. 
< insert Exhibit 17 here > 
 In order to examine the lead-lag relationship between the Derivatives and ML 
Indexes, we use a VAR model, following other studies. Blanco et al. [2005] and Norden 
and Weber [2009] studied the relationship between investment grade bonds and CDS 
prices at the single firm level, while Fung et al. [2008] studied the relationship between 
the CDS market and the US equity market. The aim of these studies was to ascertain 
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which market is more efficient in the price discovery process and so leads the other 
markets. 
 Our results from using monthly data can be seen in Exhibit 18. We do not find any 
relationship between the two indexes, so the lead role of the CDS market found by 
Blanco et al. [2005] and Norden and Weber [2009] at the single firm level is not 
confirmed at the index level.  
< insert Exhibit 18 here > 
 We utilize a VAR model because we find no signs of cointegration between the two 
series using the Engle-Granger test. For the Derivatives index, no lags are significant, 
while for ML, only ML -1 is significant at the 95% level. If we utilize daily data instead 
of monthly data (see Exhibit 19), again we find no signs of cointegration and the VAR 
model has no significant lags for the Derivatives Index, while for ML only ML -1 and 
ML -2 are significant at the 95% level. 
< insert Exhibit 19 here > 
 We conclude that there is no statistically significant lead-lag relationship between 
the Derivatives Index and the ML Index during the period between September 2006 and 
September 2011. 
 
Risk Factor Analysis 
 We now study the TE (Derivatives performance minus ML performance) using 
factor analysis, as in Fama and French [1993] in order to find out which variable best 
explains the different performances of the two indexes. We focus our analysis on the 
following factors: 
1) The excess return of the BBB bonds related to the market index ML, 
which we call excess_BBB. As we know that the Derivatives Index has a 
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higher exposure to the BBB bucket, we investigate whether this 
difference is relevant in explaining the TE. 
2) The excess return of the financial sector bonds related to the market 
index ML, termed excess_Fin. As we know that the Derivatives Index 
has a lower exposure to the financial sector, we investigate whether this 
difference is relevant. 
3) The excess return of the Bund future (10-year German government bond) 
relative to the risk free rate (1-month euribor), a factor we call Curve. 
We investigate whether an unexpected movement in the long-term 
interest rates has an impact on the TE. 
4) Variations in the implicit volatility of the DJ eurostoxx 50 Index (V2X). 
We investigate whether changes in the expected equity market volatility 
can explain the TE, due to the fact that equity market volatility is an 
input into CDS pricing models, as explained by Bedendo et al. [2011]. 
 In Exhibit 20 we present the results of a regression of TE (dependent variable) 
against the above factors (independent variables). All factors are statistically significant 
with the exception of Curve. 
< insert Exhibit 20 here > 
 In Exhibits 21 to 24 we show the results of regressing TE against each of the above 
factors in turn, and again the only factor that is not statistically significant at the 95% 
level is Curve, a result explained by the fact that the mean durations are similar for ML 
and Derivatives, as was shown earlier. 
< insert Exhibits 21 to 24 here > 
 Finally, in Exhibit 25 we present a regression of TE against all the above factors 
except for Curve, from which we can conclude the following: 
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1) If the variations in V2X, the implicit volatility in the equity market, are 
positive (higher expected volatility), this leads to a positive TE. Higher 
implicit volatility in the equity market is usually associated with higher 
uncertainty and higher spreads in the corporate bond market. This means 
that the Derivatives Index performs better in a negative environment and 
is more defensive. 
2) As expected, a positive excess return for the financial sector leads to a 
negative excess return for the Derivatives Index compared to the ML 
index because the latter has a higher exposure to this sector. 
3) If the excess return for the BBB bucket is positive, we have an under-
performance by the Derivatives Index, which is not expected due to the 
lower mean rating for this index compared to the ML Index. The 
explanation is probably that the Derivatives Index has a lower beta 
(reactions to market movements) than the ML Index due to its exposure 
to the 125 most liquid issuers. As a consequence, when the market is 
doing well (usually meaning that the BBB bucket over-performs), the TE 
is negative. 
<insert Exhibit 25 here > 
 From our factor analysis we can conclude that the most important element 
explaining TE is the excess return of the financial sector, which has the highest 
coefficient with the lowest p-value. Also, the signs of the coefficients for variations in 
the implicit equity market volatility and excess returns for the BBB bucket indicate that 
the Derivatives Index has a lower beta than the ML, a characteristic consistent with the 
lower mean asset swap spread of the Derivatives Index that we saw earlier. 
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Conclusions 
 We have compared the ML Index for the EMU corporate bonds market to an index 
constructed from an investment in the Itraxx Europe and the Bobl future (the 
“Derivatives Index”). We have shown that these two alternatives for investing in the 
corporate bond market have different characteristics that lead to different trends over the 
short term. We have seen that the TE increases as we increase the time frame, and a 
time series analysis has shown a positive autocorrelation in the difference in 
performance between the Derivatives Index and the ML Index. This could be important 
for investors who use derivatives indexes to hedge their corporate bond portfolios. 
 The two indexes do not differ meaningfully in duration, but the Derivatives Index 
has a much lower exposure to the financial sector and a lower mean rating than the ML 
Index. The lower asset swap spread and lower yield to maturity of the Derivatives Index 
suggest a more defensive composition and a lower beta compared with the ML Index. 
 The factor analysis shows that the difference in the two indexes’ performance is 
related to the Derivatives Index’s lower exposure to the financial sector and lower beta, 
with the lower beta explained by the importance of changes in the implicit equity 
market volatility and the excess return of the BBB bucket relative to the market. 
 We reveal a statistically significant positive autocorrelation for the ML Index and a 
statistically insignificant value for the Derivatives Index. There is a possible liquidity 
problem for the ML Index, and also the possibility of stale pricing, which explains the 
positive autocorrelation. This problem is not present in the Derivatives Index. 
 We do not find a lead-lag relationship between the two indexes when we apply a 
VAR model, and the lead role of the CDS market found in other papers at the single 
firm level is not statistically significant at the index level according to our data. 
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 Finally, we can state that the two indexes are similar in terms of returns, but that the 
Derivatives Index is less risky because it has a lower volatility, has values of skewness 
and kurtosis closer to those of a normal distribution and is a more liquid instrument, as 
the autocorrelation is not significant. The capitalization method used for the ML Index 
(in contrast to the equal weighting method used for the Derivatives Index) also has risks 
related to changes in the weights over time, in particular when a sector or an issuer has a 
high weight because it is highly indebted, as has been experienced by the financial 
sector recently. 
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EXHIBIT 1- INDEX CONSTRUCTION RULES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 BofA Merrill Lynch Itraxx Europe 
Inclusions Only bonds from corporations 
domiciled in EMU-participating 
countries. Only fixed coupons 
(including step-ups). Zero 
coupons, corporate pay-in-kind 
securities, and toggle notes are 
eligible 
The most liquid CDSs from 
European investment-grade 
issuers 
Exclusions Convertible securities, Bills, 
inflation-linked and strips. 
Defaulted securities 
Defaulted CDSs 
Time-to-Maturity Minimum 1 year 5 years 
Minimum requirements Minimum amount outstanding of 
€ 250 million 
None 
Number of Bonds Floating (1,790 in Dec. 2010) Fixed at 125 
Reinvestment Assumption Full reinvestment in the index Full reinvestment in the index 
Treatment of Defaults Defaulted bonds are excluded Defaulted CDSs are excluded 
Index Rebalancing End of Month Every 6 months 
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EXHIBIT 2 – YIELD TO MATURITY 
 
 
 ML Derivatives 
Mean 4.73 3.94 
Stand. Dev. 1.11 0.78 
Min 3.08 2.48 
Max 7.29 5.69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT 3 – YIELD TO MATURITY 
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EXHIBIT 4 – DURATION 
 
 
 ML Derivatives 
Mean 4.33 4.38 
Stand. Dev. 0.26 0.16 
Min 4.00 4.05 
Max 4.77 4.66 
 
 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT 5 - DURATION 
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EXHIBIT 6 – SWAP SPREAD 
 
 
 ML Derivatives 
Mean 139 92 
Stand. Dev. 86 45 
Min 25 20 
Max 348 202 
 
 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT 7 – SPREAD 
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EXHIBIT 8 – SECTOR WEIGHTS 
 
Weights for Financial sector 
 ML Derivatives 
Mean 55 20 
Stand. Dev. 2 0 
Min 52 20 
Max 60 20 
 
Weights for TMT sector 
 ML Derivatives 
Mean 9 16 
Stand. Dev. 1 0 
Min 8 16 
Max 12 16 
 
Weights for Energy&Utilities sector 
 ML Derivatives 
Mean 13 16 
Stand. Dev.  2 0 
Min 10 16 
Max 17 16 
 
Weights for Auto&Industrial sector 
 ML Derivatives 
Mean 16 24 
Stand. Dev. 0 0 
Min 15 24 
Max 16 24 
 
Weights for Consumer (ex auto) sector 
 ML Derivatives 
Mean 7 24 
Stand. Dev.  1 0 
Min 5 16 
Max 8 16 
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EXHIBIT 9 – RATINGS* 
 
 ML Derivatives 
Mean 2.75 3.35 
Stand. Dev. 0.09 0.04 
Min 2.63 3.27 
Max 2.89 3.43 
*1= AAA, 2= AA, 3= A, 4= BBB 
 
 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT 10 – RATINGS 
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EXHIBIT 11 - PERCENTAGE OF FINANCIALS IN THE ML INDEX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT 12 – PERFORMANCE* 
 
 ML Derivatives 
Mean 0.29% 0.30% 
Stand. Dev. 1.18% 1.00% 
Skewness -0.64 -0.30 
Excess Kurtosis 2.90 -0.08 
Mean annualized 3.56% 3.64% 
Stand. Dev. ann. 4.09% 3.46% 
Mean Excess Return  0.10% 0.11% 
Sharpe ratio 0.09 0.11 
*log monthly data 
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EXHIBIT 13 – PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT 14 – TRACKING ERROR* 
 
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 
4.0% 4.2% 5.2% 4.9% 6.1% 6.2% 
*annualized mean st.dev. with no overlapping data 
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EXHIBIT 15 – AUTOCORRELATION OF THE DERIVATIVES INDEX 
      
OLS, 2007:01-2011:09 (T = 57) 
Variable: Derivatives 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.003 0.002 1.761 0.084 * 
Derivatives_1 -0.049 0.136 -0.361 0.720 
Derivatives_2 -0.079 0.136 -0.582 0.563 
Derivatives_3 0.271 0.141 1.923 0.060 * 
     
R-square 0.075  R-square 
corrected 
0.023 
F (3,53) 1.441  P-value (F) 0.241 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT 16 – AUTOCORRELATION OF THE ML INDEX 
 
OLS, 2007:01-2011:09 (T = 57) 
Variable: ML 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.002 0.002 1.012 0.314 
ML_1 0.329 0.132 2.500 0.016 ** 
ML_2 -0.173 0.138 -1.251 0.217 
ML_3 0.271 0.134 2.018 0.050 ** 
     
R-square 0.153  R-square 
corrected 
0.105 
F (3,53) 3.195  P-value (F) 0.031 
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EXHIBIT 17 – AUTOCORRELATION OF THE TRACKING ERROR 
 
OLS, 2007:01-2011:09 (T = 57) 
Variable: TE 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.0001 0.002 0.079 0.937 
TE_1 0.345 0.138 2.492 0.016 ** 
TE_2 -0.006 0.149 -0.038 0.970 
TE_3 0.127 0.141 0.900 0.372 
     
R-square 0.147  R-square 
corrected 
0.099 
F (3,53) 3.046  P-value (F) 0.037 
 
 
EXHIBIT 18 – THE LEAD-LAG RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
DERIVATIVES AND ML INDEXES (MONTHLY DATA) 
 
VAR, 3 lags 
OLS, 2007:01-2011:09 (T = 57) 
 
Equation 1: Derivatives 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.003 0.002 1.737 0.089 * 
Derivatives_1 -0.059 0.163 -0.362 0.719 
Derivatives_2 -0.048 0.169 -0.285 0.788 
Derivatives_3 0.275 0.165 1.662 0.103 
ML_1 0.004 0.144 0.030 0.976 
ML_2 -0.059 0.157 -0.376 0.708 
ML_3 -0.003 0.144 -0.020 0.984 
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R-square 0.079  R-square 
corrected 
-0.031 
F (6,50) 0.716  P-value (F) 0.638 
 
Equation 2: ML 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.002 0.002 1.311 0.196 
Derivatives_1 -0.311 0.178 -1.750 0.086 * 
Derivatives_2 -0.109 0.183 -0.593 0.556 
Derivatives_3 0.207 0.179 1.158 0.252 
ML_1 0.467 0.156 2.995 0.004 *** 
ML_2 -0.175 0.170 -1.028 0.309 
ML_3 0.170 0.156 1.091 0.281 
     
R-square 0.226  R-square 
corrected 
0.133 
F (6,50) 2.434  P-value (F) 0.038 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT 19 – THE LEAD-LAG RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
DERIVATIVES AND ML INDEXES (DAILY DATA) 
 
 
VAR, 3 lags 
OLS, daily 2006/10/04-2011/09/30 (T = 1367) 
 
Equation 1: Derivatives 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
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Const 0.0002 0.00007 2.655 0.008 *** 
Derivatives_1 0.037 0.036 1.030 0.303 
Derivatives_2 -0.021 0.036 -0.583 0.560 
Derivatives_3 0.052 0.035 1.469 0.142 
ML_1 -0.045 0.047 -0.961 0.337 
ML_2 0.062 0.047 1.310 0.191 
ML_3 -0.084 0.046 -1.811 0.070 * 
 
R-square 0.004  R-square 
corrected 
-0.0002 
F (6,50) 0.947  P-value (F) 0.460 
 
Equation 2: ML 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.0001 0.00005 2.215 0.027 ** 
Derivatives_1 0.007 0.027 0.261 0.795 
Derivatives_2 -0.018 0.027 -0.648 0.517 
Derivatives_3 0.019 0.027 0.701 0.484 
ML_1 0.150 0.036 4.184 0.00003 *** 
ML_2 0.098 0.036 2.712 0.007 *** 
ML_3 0.038 0.036 1.060 0.290 
     
R-square 0.043  R-square 
corrected 
0.039 
F (6,50) 10.203  P-value (F) 4.57  
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EXHIBIT 20 – REGRESSION OF TE (DEPENDENT VARIABLE) AGAINST 
THE OTHER FACTORS (INDEPENDENT VARIABLES) 
 
OLS, 2006:11-2011:09 (T =59) 
Variable: TE 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const -0.0008 0.001 -0.645 0.522 
var_V2X 0.015 0.006 2.437 0.018 ** 
Excess_BBB -0.489 0.157 -3.107 0.003 *** 
Excess_Fin -1.063 0.260 -4.086 0.0002 *** 
Curve -0.079 0.073 -1.084 0.283 
     
R-square 0.477  R-square 
corrected 
0.439 
F (4,54) 12.336  p-value (F) 3.40  
 
 
 
EXHIBIT 21 – REGRESSION OF TE AGAINST CURVE FACTOR 
 
OLS, 2006:11-2011:09 (T =60) 
Variable: TE 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.0002 0.002 0.110 0.913 
Curve 0.616 0.081 1.981 0.052 * 
     
R-square 0.063  R-square 
corrected 
0.047 
F (1,58) 3.924  p-value (F) 0.052 
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EXHIBIT 22 – REGRESSION OF TE AGAINST var_V2X FACTOR 
 
OLS, 2006:11-2011:09 (T =59) 
Variable: TE 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const -0.0008 0.001 -0.604 0.549 
var_V2X 0.027 0.006 4.546 0.00003 *** 
     
R-square 0.266  R-square 
corrected 
0.253 
F (1,57) 20.665  p-value (F) 0.00003 
 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT 23 – REGRESSION OF TE AGAINST Excess_Fin FACTOR 
 
OLS, 2006:11-2011:09 (T =60) 
Variable: TE 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const -0.0008 0.001 -0.579 0.565 
Excess_Fin -1.158 0.265 -4.367 0.00005 *** 
     
R-square 0.247  R-square 
corrected 
0.234 
F (1,58) 19.068  p-value (F) 0.00005 
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EXHIBIT 24 – REGRESSION OF TE AGAINST BBB FACTOR 
 
OLS, 2006:11-2011:09 (T =60) 
Variable: TE 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const 0.002 0.001 1.643 0.106 
Excess_BBB -0.451 0.070 -6.475 <0.00001 *** 
     
R-square 0.420  R-square 
corrected 
0.410 
F (1,58) 41.929  p-value (F) 2.22  
 
 
 
EXHIBIT 25 – REGRESSION OF TE AGAINST ALL OTHER FACTORS 
EXCLUDING CURVE 
 
OLS, 2006:11-2011:09 (T =59) 
Variable: TE 
 Coefficient Std. Error t stat p-value 
Const -0.0007 0.001 -0.634 0.529 
var_V2X 0.014 0.006 2.293 0.026 ** 
Excess_BBB -0.440 0.151 -2.213 0.005 *** 
Excess_Fin -0.975 0.248 -3.938 0.0002 *** 
     
R-square 0.466  R-square 
corrected 
0.437 
F (3,55) 16.006  p-value (F) 1.34  
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Chapter 4: The impact of Fallen Angels on 
Investment Grade Corporate Bonds portfolios: 
evidence from the European market 
 
 
 
 Paper presented at the Multinational Finance Conference, Roma, June 26-29 2011. 
 
 
Introduction 
Corporate bonds that have suffered a downgrade from the Investment Grade (IG) 
to the speculative grade category are generally known as fallen angels (FA). The 
advantage of investing in this category of securities has long been debated by academic 
researchers and investment professionals alike. The rising importance of FA securities 
grew to become a proper asset class of investment, can be deducted from the trading 
volume and the relative weight that they acquire within the wider category of the High 
Yield (HY) bonds. Examining the trading volume of FA we observe that it has 
increased steadily in recent years, reaching or exceeding the $100bn in 2002, 2005, and 
20081. According to Merrill Lynch data, during the 2004-2008 five year period, FA 
represented over $300bn in HY supply, roughly half of the original HY new issuance 
during the period. In 2009 alone, FA represented $1 in $4 dollars of all outstanding HY 
rising from an average of 10-15% in the period from 1997 to 2002.  
 Extensive literature aims to investigate the characteristics of FA. The risk-return 
profile of this asset class have been compared to both the HY and the Original Issue 
High-yield bonds (OI), defined as those securities that are rated speculative grade at 
issue. Among the most notable studies, Fridson and Sterling (2006) show that, over the 
                                                            
1 High Yield Strategy. Fallen Angels: Gems or Empty Shells?. Bank of America – Merrill Lynch, March 
2009. 
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period 1996-2006, OI have produced lower return with higher risk than FA. Besides, 
Altman and Fanjul (2004) highlight the importance of focusing on these securities 
especially from the portfolio managers’ perspective. They demonstrate that the median 
weighted average recovery rate on FA defaulting issues is 70% for the period 1982-
2003. This compares to about 42.4% for the category of HY and about 29% for OI. 
They conclude that, from a default loss standpoint, FAs appear to be less risky than OI 
securities.  
 It has been observed that institutional investors are the most involved in corporate 
bond trading activity and are also the major holders of these securities. This evidence is 
supported by the fact that corporate bonds mainly trade in block size, besides minimum 
lots are usually too high for retail investors. For this reason, the downgrade to junk bond 
affects, above all, the investment choices on three categories of institutional portfolios: 
investment funds characterized by regulatory constraints based on credit rating (i.e. 
insurance funds), passive investment vehicles (i.e. Exchange Traded Funds, ETF) and 
mutual funds characterized by tracking error restrictions. The first category of portfolios 
deals with regulatory constraints that restrict or prohibit the ownership of speculative-
grade debt to limit the resources earmarked when they invest in riskier assets besides for 
reputational considerations (Ambrose et al., 2008). In greater detail, the purpose of 
rating-based governance rules is to mitigate the agency problems between fund 
managers and investors as fund managers are discouraged from following opportunistic, 
high-risk strategies2. From an operational perspective the fund’s regulation impose the 
forced sale of all securities that fall below IG regardless of any market price valuation 
and opportunity. This circumstance is common to the passive investment vehicles that 
                                                            
2 The theme of the role of credit ratings as tools for portfolio governance has been addressed by Loffler 
(2004), who evaluates the efficiency rating-based portfolio governance approach comparing it to the 
market base approach. 
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track IG indices, as their investment objective is the full replication of the underlying 
index. The relevance of these funds in the market is demonstrated by their recent 
growth: out of 28 existing ETFs denominated in euro that track IG corporate bonds 
indices, 23 have been created during or after 2009. As a consequence, the growth of the 
assets under management by ETFs provokes an increasingly relevant price pressure on 
those securities deleted from their underling benchmarks. Similarly, the FAs’ exit from 
the IG indices, although with greater operational flexibility, results in the requirement to 
sell these securities for those managers who have the obligation of holding securities 
with an IG rating and/or who have tracking error restrictions.   
 Mainstream analysis of the impact of the index rebalancing on portfolios has 
focused so far, to our knowledge, solely on stock market indices. Cai and Houge (2008), 
for example, assess the impact of index rebalancing on long-term index performance 
and portfolio evaluation. Examining deletions and additions to the Russell 2000 small-
cap index from 1979 to 2004, they notice that a buy-and-hold portfolio significantly 
outperforms the rebalanced index over five years.  
Our study instead analyses the impact of the index rebalancing on the corporate 
bond market focusing on Euro denominated securities, a segment traditionally reviewed 
less often than the US Dollar denominated one. Moved by this purpose, we implement 
an event study aiming to verify the effect of a downgrade that crosses the IG boundary 
on a bond’s price. We examine corporate bonds that exit the Merrill Lynch Emu Non 
Financial Corporate Index during January 2001 and December 2009 because of a 
downgrade to junk status by Moody’s and/or S&Ps. It is worth highlighting that the 
rebalancing criteria of the ML Emu Non Financial Corporate Index are common to the 
ones associated with other corporate bond indices such as the Iboxx EUR Bonds, the 
underlying benchmark of some Exchange Traded Funds (ETF). For this reason, our 
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results can be easily generalized to the overall index funds category that replicates a 
corporate bonds index. We adopt the event study methodology using daily data from the 
Bloomberg database. Our sample consists of the most representative issues of the 
corporate bond market (in the U.S. and in Europe both denominated in Euro) hence 
composed only by large and liquid issues. Due to the characteristics of our sample, we 
assume that the prices provided by Bloomberg correspond to transaction prices rather 
than matrix prices (refer to Section 3 for an in-depth discussion about issues related to 
the use of matrix prices and the choice of reliable prices).  
We calculate the abnormal returns in three representative analyses. In the first one 
we examine the effect of the announcement of first downgrade to junk status by one of 
the two rating agencies. In accordance with the literature (Grier and Katz, 1976; 
Wansley et al., 1992; Hand et al., 1992; Hite and Warga, 1997; Steiner and Heinke, 
2001; May, 2010), we find both abnormal returns statistically significant in 
correspondence of the announcement day and in the course of the month preceding the 
downgrade (see Section 2 for an overview). In the second event study we perform, we 
examine the effect of the second downgrade, which determines the revision of the 
security to the FA category. Again we record a significant bond market reaction, more 
amplified than in the previous case. 
Widening the existing literature we also focus on the effect of the subsequent 
bond deletion from the IG benchmark, observing positive and significant ARs in the 
month following the event. This result indicates that the selling pressure on the bond 
price decreases at the time of the securities’ release from the index. In other words, our 
original finding is that once the securities leave the IG index they show a significant 
over-performance compared to the high yields. These insights offer some practical 
guidelines for those professionals that manage IG and/or HY portfolios.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the main studies 
that focus on the impact of downgrades on the bonds’ price; Sections 3 and 4 present the 
data and the details of the methodology we adopted. Section 5 reports the results of the 
event studies while Section 6 comprises some final remarks and concludes the paper.  
 
Literature overview on the impact of bonds’ downgrade 
 A broad body of research examines the impact of the changes in credit rating on 
the bond’s price using the event study methodology highlighting significant negative 
average excess returns associated with a downgrade. Examining the price impact on 
bonds re-rated by S&Ps between 1982 and 1984 through weekly data, Wansley et al. 
(1992) find a strong negative announcement effect during the week of bond rating 
reductions. Moreover, although the reaction is concentrated in the week of the rating 
change, they find a negative response as early as three weeks prior to the week of the 
press release by the rating agency. In a study published in the same year but using daily 
data, Hand et al. (1992) find negative average excess bond returns in correspondence of 
the announcement day to downgrades declared by Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) 
and Standard & Poor's (S&P) between 1977 and 1982. In addition, they find that the 
average excess returns are stronger for speculative grade than for IG bonds. Aside from 
this, Grier and Katz (1976) show that the impact on a bond’s price occurs during the 
post-announcement period and that it is stronger for industrial firms if compared to 
utility ones. Observing the rating changes in the years 1966-72 and using monthly data, 
they reveal a price drop that occurs in the month-of and the month-subsequent to a 
rating reclassification. Similarly, examining the effect of rating changes of industrial 
firms between 1985 and 1995, and using monthly data, Hite and Warga (1997) show 
highly significant negative cumulative abnormal returns during the event-month and in 
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the six months after a rating change for downgrades remaining below IG. They also find 
highly significant positive excess returns for all rating changes in the six months prior to 
a downgrade. Furthermore, they assert that the magnitude of the downgrading effect 
increases dramatically, moving from the sample of IG to non-IG firms. Focusing on the 
German Eurobond market, Steiner and Heinke (2001) examining daily excess returns 
driven by rating changes in the period 1985-1996 find price movements up to 100 
trading days before the downgrade and with the strongest reaction in correspondence of 
the announcement day. They also find a positive excess returns after the downgrade, 
between day 15 and 45 post-announcement; this result suggests a bond price behavior 
that can be explained by the investors’ attitude to overreact to downgrades followed by 
a rebound afterwards. Recently, examining the rating changes during the period 2002-
2009, May (2010) provides evidence of negative abnormal bond returns during the 
month prior to downgrades and a cumulative abnormal return larger in magnitude and 
highly significant in correspondence of the announcement day. Moreover, May (2010) 
highlights that bond prices show negative abnormal returns in the 10 days after the 
firm’s downgrade. In accordance, Ben Dor and Xu (2011) show negative monthly 
excess returns up to 3 quarters before the downgrade and the strongest reaction during 
the rating event month.   
It is worth noting that the methodology used in the mentioned studies has been the 
subject of an extensive debate. In particular, the presence of conflicting results around 
the impact of downgrades on a bond’s price obtained in less contemporary studies (i.e. 
Weinstein, 1977) are mainly ascribed to the poor quality of data used in the past. To 
explain this in more detail, when the availability of data on the Corporate Bond over-
the-counter (OTC) market was limited, the data analyzed was deducted from the 
infrequent bond trades on the NYSE. A further dispute concerning the methodology 
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adopted concerns the use of monthly, as opposed to daily, data (see Brown and Warner, 
1985). Bessembinder et al. (2009) address this matter analysing the empirical power and 
specification of test statistics designed to detect abnormal bond returns in corporate 
event studies. They find that the use of daily bond data significantly increases the power 
of the tests compared to the use of monthly data and they demonstrate that most 
methods implemented in monthly data, lack power to detect abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, the authors accurately define the appropriate methodology to be used to 
calculate the daily abnormal bond returns to which we refer in this study. 
 
Data and Sample selection 
In this study we examine the dynamics of the Merrill Lynch (ML) Emu Non 
Financial Corporate Index during January 20013 to December 2009. The index’s 
composition is based on a set of publicly disclosed rules aiming to guarantee both the 
index replicability (in order to avoid illiquid securities) and a credit risk bound to the 
IG. The index provider releases credit ratings based on a composite of Moody’s and 
S&P4. The index is rebalanced on the last calendar day of the month, based on the 
information available in the marketplace up to and including the third business day prior 
to the last business day of the month. Rating changes that take place after the third 
business day prior to the last business day of the month are not taken into consideration 
until the following rebalancing. ML establishes four criteria that can initiate a bond’s 
deletion from the index: 1) maturity less than one year; 2) illiquidity; 3) a bond’s rating 
unavailability; 4) downgrade from investment to non-investment-grade level. Our 
                                                            
3 The starting date of our sample has been determined by the data availability of the ratings of the index 
components. 
4 If a bond is rated by only one service, its composite rating is equal to that individual rating. The 
calculation of a composite rating is undertaken by an averaging algorithm that is biased to the lower of 
the two ratings. 
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analysis is focused on the bonds deleted from the index following the event mentioned 
in the last of these criteria. Operationally, we monitor the composition of the ML Emu 
Non Financial Corporate Index every month and we identify the FAs, using the 
definition provided by Ambrose et al. (2008): “A fallen angel is a bond that once had 
an investment-grade rating from Moody’s or S&P (not necessarily both) but was 
downgraded and it no longer possesses an investment-grade rating from either”. Our 
sample is composed only by fixed-rate corporate bonds issued by industrial firms and 
denominated in Euro. Unlike the dataset used in previous studies, our sample is solely 
composed of benchmarks’ constituents, the most representative issues in the corporate 
bond market and, therefore, the most traded.  
At the issue level, the number of FA during the observation period is 149. We 
exclude from this preliminary sample 56 bonds because of their low liquidity around the 
event under investigation. Following the approach of Bessembinder et al. (2009) and 
May (2010) in order to deal with bonds illiquidity, we impose three trading restrictions. 
Being Day 0 the day of the event, the first one is that, to be part of our data set, a bond 
has to show a price change at least on ten days during the intervals going from Day -15 
to -1 and Day +1 to +15. Moreover, we require price changes on fifteen days in the 
periods (-30; -1) and (+1; +30). Finally, we require that those bonds are priced every 
day from Day -1 to Day +1. Although the sample size becomes much smaller we 
believe that, in case of a downgrade that crosses the IG boundary of a large issuer, the 
FA’s price should change before and after the event to ensure the reliability of the bond 
data. We also decided to exclude from our sample 8 defaulted bonds issued by Enron 
(US) and Parmalat (IT) because, in these cases, the downgrade announcement has taken 
place just before the company default and, thus, before the index rebalancing. This 
means that the default bonds would not enter into the sample of our third analysis in any 
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case. On the other hand, the exclusion of these bonds from the sample of the first two 
analyses allows obtaining more conservative results. This choice is also justified by the 
evidence that the prices of default bonds, being characterized by high bid-ask spread, 
are not accurate. Furthermore, and in line with Bessembinder et al. (2009), we believe 
that bankruptcies should not be included in a sample for studies that examine events 
unrelated to bankruptcy. Finally, to avoid positive correlation from bonds issued from 
the same firm, we use a portfolio approach to compute firms’ abnormal returns and treat 
each firm downgrade as a single observation. As a result, we obtain a final list of 85 
bonds issued by 48 companies, admittedly a biased sample of large firms (with liquid 
bonds). 
In our analysis, we use daily prices from the over-the-counter (OTC) dealer 
market. The reason lies on the evidence that the corporate bond market is institutional in 
nature with trading conducted primarily OTC. The problem related to the quality of 
corporate bond price data has been largely discussed in literature5. As described in 
Warga (1991) and Warga and Welch (1993), the two sources of generally available 
price quotes are exchange prices and institutional prices from major OTC bond dealers. 
Exchange prices primarily reflect the odd-lot activities of individual investors and cover 
only a limited number of corporate issues and a negligible portion of the total trading. 
On the other hand, institutional data is more comprehensive than exchange data because 
it covers a larger number of bonds, offering prices at which large positions could have 
been or indeed were transacted. Warga and Welch (1993) highlighted a potential issue 
related to the use of institutional data when conducting research in this area: the 
complication derives from the fact that prices are generally supplied by commercial 
services (e.g., Bloomberg Financial Services) and are not always trader quotes. These 
                                                            
5 See Goltz and Campani (2011) for a detailed analysis of the corporate bond price sources. 
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prices are often determined on the base of an algorithm (so-called “matrix” prices)6. 
They demonstrate that trader-quoted data is preferable in research investigating 
corporate bond reactions to firm-specific events. As explained by Goltz and Campani 
(2011) every source of price lack in reliability in the case of rarely traded securities. 
In our case, the sample is composed only by large and liquid bonds, and we can 
assume that prices supplied by commercial services are, in all respects, transaction 
prices. Encouraged by this, we calculate daily returns using Bloomberg information 
provider7. The choice to use Bloomberg database provides two main benefits to our 
analysis: first of all it allows us to examine the impact of downgrades using data on a 
daily basis and secondly it provides figures for the European corporate bond market for 
the entire period of our investigation. 
 
Methodology 
Our work is divided into three different analyses. In the first analysis we calculate 
abnormal returns considering, as the unit of observation, the first rating change at the 
firm level. Conventionally, we identify Day 0 as the downgrade announcement day by 
one or both of Moody’s and S&P rating agencies. We use Bloomberg to identify the 
rating changes by the two agencies during the sample period. Along with the common 
announcement window (-1; +1), as in May (2010) we consider two pre-event windows, 
(-30; -1) and (-15;-1), and the post-event window (+2; +10). We also calculate abnormal 
                                                            
6 In the case of bonds that do not trade, matrix prices are based on quoted prices for securities with similar 
coupons, ratings and maturities, rather than on specific bids and offers for the designated security. 
7 It is worth mentioning that Bloomberg prices are market consensus prices, considering all the indicative 
and executable quotes on its database. These prices are weighted average and tends to apply higher 
significance to the more robust pricing contributors. Moreover, these prices are generally end-of-day, 
with occasional intraday updates, created by a proprietary algorithm that needs at least two providers to 
form. 
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return in two other post-event windows (+2; +20) and (+2; +30) to observe whether the 
bonds display ARs after the downgrade event.  
In our second study Day 0 coincides with the event of the second downgrade by 
the rating agencies (if the rate-change does not overlap). In this case, the bond observed 
becomes an FA in line with Ambrose et al. (2008) definition. In this case Day 0 is the 
date in which the bond loses the investment-grade rating from both the rating agencies. 
Furthermore, we calculate abnormal returns on the same event windows of the previous 
analysis. 
The third analysis focuses on the rebalancing of the ML Emu Non Financial 
Corporate Index where Day 0 is the date of the index rebalancing. Although the bond’s 
deletion from the benchmark cannot be considered an event by its conventional 
definition, as its occurrence is normally known in advance, we treat it as such to verify 
whether ARs occur around the index rebalancing. For this reason, we consider the same 
two pre-event windows as in both our previous analyses, (-30;-1) and (-15;-1), besides 
the (-1; +1) event window. As post-event windows we consider four intervals starting 
from the first day following the index rebalancing, Day +1, up to Day +5, +10, +15 and 
+30.  
Consistently with Bessembinder et al. (2009) we define the bond’s daily return as 
follows:  
Bond Return 
1
1

 
t
ttt
P
AIPP          (1) 
Where Pt-1 and Pt are the daily prices on Days t-1 and t respectively and AIt is the 
interest accrued over Day t8. Aiming to compare each bond return with its homogeneous 
high yield category, we form matching portfolios and we use these as benchmark 
                                                            
8 The annual coupon is based on a 365 day period. Business days are determined in accordance with a 
global holiday schedule. AI considers non trading days.   
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portfolios. Like Bessembinder et al. (2009) we rely on well diversified portfolios of 
bonds managed by a primary index provider. In particular, we rely on indices 
representative of the speculative bond market, divided by rating class and provided by 
Merrill Lynch (ML), to form the matching portfolios. ML classifies speculative grade 
bonds into three classes of rating: BB, B and CCC & lower rated.  
For each issue we follow the credit rating evolution during the observed event 
window. Afterwards, we calculate an index able to reflect the daily return of the overall 
bond’s rating category whose daily returns are expressed as:  
   tlowerCCCR ,&  if the bond is rated CCC or lower at date t; 
     
   tBR ,   if the bond is rated B at date t;   
          (3) 
IRt =  tBBR ,   if the bond is rated BB at date t;  
     
   tINVR ,   if the bond is rated IG at date t . 
 
Where IRt is the return of matching portfolio at date t; RCCC&lower,t is the return of the 
ML Euro CCC & lower rated Index at date t; RB,t is the return of the ML Euro B rated 
Index at date t; RBB,t is the return of the ML Euro BB rated Index at date t and RINV,t is 
the return of the ML Emu Non Financial Corporate Index at date t and that represents 
the return of the investment-grade bond. These dynamic matching portfolios are 
calculated through the daily compounded performances of the HY indices, 
homogeneously associated with each bond. If a firm experiences multiple rating 
changes during the observation period, we include all the rating changes thus allowing a 
constant match of credit risk. It is worth noting that the HY indices that we use in this 
comparison follow the same composition rules of the ML Emu Non Financial Corporate 
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Index; this implies that they consist of the most representative issues of the rating class 
they are affiliated with. We calculate the daily abnormal return (ARt) as the difference 
between bond return (Rt) and the return on an index of rating matched corporate bonds 
(IRt ): 
  ARt = Rt - IRt            (4) 
This comparison gives an evaluation of the difference between the returns registered by 
the bond with respect to the equivalent class of risk.  
As in previous studies for firms in the sample with multiple bonds we treat each 
firm as a portfolio. According to Grier and Katz (1976) we first averaged (equally) the 
abnormal returns to all bonds of the same firm and then averaged (equally) across firms. 
Therefore, the average abnormal bond return for firm k on Day t (ARk,t) is calculated as: 
n
AR
AR
n
i
ti
tk

 1
,
,                                                                                                   (5) 
Where n is the number of issues in the sample for firm k, ARi,t is the abnormal return for 
bond i on day t. 
 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 shows the results of our first analysis, where the announcement date (Day 
0) coincides with the date of the first downgrade either from Moody’s or S&P, or both 
at the same time. The table provides the mean CARs for each window examined, the t-
statistic and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test9. We find negative CARs in 
the pre-event windows analyzed. In particular, for both the test statistics we used, the 
mean (-30; -1) CAR is -4.45%, statistically significant. Moreover, (-15; -1) CAR is -
                                                            
9 While the t test is based on the cross sectional standard error, the Wilcoxon test does not rely on the 
assumption of normal distribution of returns but on a symmetric distribution around the median. 
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2.38% with a statistical significance of 10% based only on the t-test. These results 
confirm the findings of Wansley et al. (1992), Hite and Warga (1997), Steiner and 
Heinke (2001), May (2010)10 and Ben Dor and Xu (2011) about the negative excess 
returns registered by the bond’s price before the downgrade. As expected, within the 
announcement window (-1; +1), we observe a highly significant CAR of -3.64%11. This 
result can be explained by a typical mechanism of the asset management industry: 
whenever a security is removed from the benchmarks, portfolio managers concentrate 
their selling orders during a small period. The obvious final effect is a more deeply 
stressed market price. On the other hand, we observe different results from Grier and 
Katz (1976), Hite and Warga (1997) and May (2010) concerning their findings about 
the negative excess returns registered in the days after the downgrade. Our results 
provide the absence of significance of the CARs related to the post event windows (+2; 
+10), (+2; +20) and (+2; +30).  
Table 1 
 
The impact of the downgrade to high yield on corporate bonds price. CARs are calculated considering, as 
unit of observation, the first rating change (declared by either Moody’s or S&Ps) at the firm level. The 
sample consists of bonds that are deleted from the investment grade ML Emu Non Financial Corporate 
Index during the period January 2001 to December 2009. The sample is composed of 85 bonds issued by 
48 companies. To be included in the sample the data set of each bond has to show at least ten price 
changes during the intervals going from Day -15 to -1 and Day +1 to +15; at least fifteen price changes in 
the periods (-30; -1) and (+2;+30) and must be priced every day from Day -1 to Day +1. The analysis is 
based on daily prices provided by Bloomberg Financial Services. In the case of firms with multiple 
bonds, each firm is treated as a portfolio. CARs are the sum of the firm’s daily abnormal returns over the 
event windows. 
 
                                                            
10 Having used the same event windows, we can consistently compare our findings with the author’s 
results. This comparison is instrumental to confirm the reliability of the prices used in our study. In 
particular, May (2010) displays, in relation to the speculative grade sample, mean CARs in the intervals (-
30;-1) and (-15;-1) of -4.52% and -2.36% respectively. These results are in line with our findings. 
11 It is worth mentioning that the latter result reflects a stronger impact of the downgrade on the bond’s 
price if compared to the one registered by May (2010) within the announcement window (-0.88%). The 
difference in magnitude can be ascribed to the fact that our study is focused merely on downgrades that 
cross the investment-grade boundary leading to a deeper market reaction. Thus, confirming Hite and 
Warga (1997) and Ben Dor and Xu (2011) findings, we prove that moving from the IG to the speculative 
grade rating the intensity of the bond price reaction is amplified. 
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Event Window 
(days) Mean CAR t-stat Signed-rank
(-30;-1) -4.45% -2.70*** -2.04*
(-15;-1) -2.38% -1.85* -0.97
(-1;+1) -3.64% -2.78*** -2.81***
(+2;+10) 1.20% 1.10 0.74
(+2;+20) 1.62% 1.17 1.52
(+2;+30) 1.29% 0.73 1.28
* Statistical significance  at the 10% level in two-tailed tests.
** Statistical significance  at the 5% level in two-tailed tests.
*** Statistical significance  at the 1% level in two-tailed tests.  
 
Table 2 provides evidence of the second event study we performed. In this case, 
the event is represented by the downgrade from both rating agencies. According to our 
preceding analysis, the pre-event windows show negative CARs, statistically significant 
based on the t-test: the mean (-30; -1) CAR and (-15; -1) CAR are -4.76% and -4.40% 
respectively. Besides, the short term reaction to the announcement is reflected by the (-
1; +1) CAR equal to -3.48%. These results are slightly stronger than those calculated in 
our previous analysis. Moreover, also in this case we don’t register significant CARs in 
the post-event windows.  
Table 2 
 
The impact of the downgrade to high yield on corporate bonds price. The event is represented by the 
departure of the bond from the investment grade parameters of both the rating agencies (Moody’s and 
S&Ps), therefore becoming an FA. The sample consists of bonds that are deleted from the investment 
grade ML Emu Non Financial Corporate Index during the period January 2001 to December 2009. The 
sample is composed of 77 bonds issued by 41 companies. To be included in the sample the data set of 
each bond has to show at least ten price changes during the intervals going from Day -15 to -1 and Day 
+1 to +15; at least fifteen price changes in the periods (-30; -1) and (+2;+30) and must be priced every 
day from Day -1 to Day +1. The analysis is based on daily prices provided by Bloomberg Financial 
Services. In the case of firms with multiple bonds, each firm is treated as a portfolio. CARs are the sum of 
the firm’s daily abnormal returns over the event windows. 
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Event Window 
(days) Mean CAR t-stat Signed-rank
(-30;-1) -4.76% -2.23** -1.15
(-15;-1) -4.40% -2.50** -1.60
(-1;+1) -3.48% -2.20** -1.16
(+2;+10) 0.66% 0.62 -0.33
(+2;+20) 1.62% 1.46 0.56
(+2;+30) 1.18% 0.81 0.30
* Statistical significance  at the 10% level in two-tailed tests.
** Statistical significance  at the 5% level in two-tailed tests.
*** Statistical significance  at the 1% level in two-tailed tests.  
 
Finally, our third analysis investigates the impact of the month’s end rebalancing 
of the IG index examined in this paper. Table 3 summarizes our results: in this case we 
find a mean CAR in the pre-event window (-30; -1) of -5.00%, statistically significant 
based on both the t-test and Wilcoxon test. According to the findings of the two 
previous analyses, this result can be explained by the impact of the downgrade 
announcement on bond prices at some point during the preceding month of the 
rebalancing. This proposition is supported by the evidence that, on average, the time 
that elapses between the first downgrade and the index rebalancing is 24 trading days.  
 
Table 3 
 
The impact of the downgrade to high yield on corporate bonds price. Day 0 is the date of the index 
rebalancing. The sample consists of bonds that are deleted from the investment grade ML Emu Non 
Financial Corporate Index during the period January 2001 to December 2009. The sample is composed of 
82 bonds issued by 47 companies. To be included in the sample the data set of each bond has to show at 
least ten price changes during the intervals going from Day -15 to -1 and Day +1 to +15; at least fifteen 
price changes in the periods (-30; -1) and (+1;+30) and must be priced every day from Day -1 to Day +1. 
The analysis is based on daily prices provided by Bloomberg Financial Services. In the case of firms with 
multiple bonds, each firm is treated as a portfolio. CARs are the sum of the firm’s daily abnormal returns 
over the event windows. 
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Event Window 
(days) Mean CAR t-stat Signed-rank
(-30;-1) -5.00% -2.76*** -2.11**
(-15;-1) -2.60% -1.82* -1.51
(-1;+1) 0.99% 1.81* 1.12
(+1;+5) 1.12% 2.96*** 3.03***
(+1;+10) 1.91% 3.27*** 2.94***
(+1;+15) 1.59% 2.74*** 2.74***
(+1;+30) 0.81% 0.85 2.04**
* Statistical significance  at the 10% level in two-tailed tests.
** Statistical significance  at the 5% level in two-tailed tests.
*** Statistical significance  at the 1% level in two-tailed tests.  
As expected, we do not report a significant CAR around the event window (-1; 
+1). We argue that this evidence is attributable to the fact that the index rebalancing 
rules are known in advance to the investors; hence the bond’s exit from the index does 
not have any short term impact on their price. More important are the results related to 
the post-event windows: (+1; +5), (+1; +10) and (+1; +15) display positive mean CARs 
of +1.12%, +1.91% and +1.59% respectively. These results are highly significant based 
on both t-test and signed-rank test. The excess returns calculated after the index 
rebalancing demonstrate that the bond, after the deletion from the benchmark, registers 
an over-performance versus the category of securities having an equivalent class of risk. 
This occurrence can be seen as a bond price rebound following the pressure driven by 
regulatory and investment constraints of both traditional funds and index trackers. 
Confirming Steiner and Heinke (2001) results, our findings suggest that the price 
pressure that occurs in correspondence to a downgrade is reabsorbed several days after 
its announcement. In addition, we argue that the bond price reversal follows the 
rebalancing of the IG indices. 
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These insights offer some practical guidelines. Firstly, the positive excess returns 
with respect to the HY category, observed on the following days of the index 
rebalancing, show the loss of value paid by a portfolio anchored to the index 
construction methodology of the underlying benchmark. Secondly, the impact on the 
bond prices is attributable to the disinvestments made around the downgrade 
announcement, before the index rebalancing. This evidence suggests a careful market 
timing evaluation for the portfolio manager following an IG benchmark. The 
implications are more straightforward when managing a portfolio of HY: our results 
reveal the opportunity to overweigh FA around the day they are removed from the IG 
benchmarks. Furthermore, and consistently with Cai and Houge (2008), our results 
suggest that the index design methodology may provide a structural incentive for 
portfolio managers to drift from their benchmark. 
 
Conclusions 
We have examined the impact of downgrades to high yield on corporate bond 
prices from January 2001 until December 2009, using daily data on bond transactions 
provided by Bloomberg Financial Services. Our analysis focuses on a sample of 
corporate bonds released by the ML Emu Non Financial Corporate Index from the 
moment when they become HY. The ML Emu Non Financial Corporate Index is 
representative of the largest and most liquid Euro denominated US and European issues, 
it is commonly used as the benchmark by IG corporate bond funds and it follows the 
same rebalancing rules of other corporate bond indices. For these reasons, we can 
assume that our results can be generalized to the overall index funds category that 
replicates an IG corporate bonds index.  
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We calculate the abnormal returns in three different analyses based over a sample 
composed by 85 bonds issued by 48 companies. In the first, we calculate abnormal 
returns in the event of the first downgrade (declared by either Moody’s or S&Ps) at the 
firm level. In the second analysis the event is represented by the deletions of the bond 
from the IG parameters of both the rating agencies (therefore becoming an FA). Both of 
our analyses, according to the major results of the existing literature, prove significant 
negative CARs in the pre-event windows and in the announcement window. On the 
other hand, in contrast with the findings of previous studies, we do not find significant 
negative CARs in the post-event windows.  
 Widening the existing literature, our third analysis investigates the impact of the 
month-end rebalancing of the ML Emu Non Financial Corporate Index. In this case, we 
find a statistically significant negative CAR of -5.00% in the pre-event window (-30; -
1). Moreover, in this last case we do not report a significant CAR in the event window 
(-1;+1): the reason is that the index rebalancing rules are known in advance, hence the 
bond’s deletion from the index does not have any short term impact on their prices. 
Furthermore, we find positive and statistically significant CARs of +1.12%, +1.91% and 
+1.59% in the post-event windows respectively (+1; +5), (+1; +10) and (+1; +15). 
One possible criticism of this study could be related to the use of Bloomberg 
prices instead of traders’ quotes, based on the argument that prices supplied by 
commercial services are sometimes determined on the base of an algorithm (“matrix 
prices”) that compromise their reliability. We argue that in our case, Bloomberg prices 
should coincide with transaction prices as our analysis focuses only on large and liquid 
issues. Moreover, Bloomberg dataset covers the entire period observed in our analysis 
for Euro denominated corporate bonds, as opposed to other databases, which take into 
account shorter time intervals and only US Dollar denominated issues. Furthermore, the 
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novelty of this study lies in our third analysis, focused on the impact of the bonds’ 
deletion from the IG benchmarks. This analysis is based on month-end prices, 
considered the most reliable, as traders have a strong incentive to provide accurate bid 
quotes, given the significant amount of trading generated by index trackers funds (Hite 
and Warga, 1997). The abnormal returns recorded after the deletion of the bonds from 
the index, vis-à-vis the new risk category, suggest a selling pressure around the 
downgrade event. 
Our findings confirm that the price pressure takes place mostly around the time of 
the announcement and/or in the preceding trading days. In addition, our results reveal 
higher abnormal returns for the bonds that become speculative grade for both the rating 
agencies. This evidence relates to the mandate of some investment professionals to sell 
high yields due to portfolio governance guidance. It’s worth noting that our results can 
be generalized to take into account the wider issue of the appropriateness of the 
portfolio management constraints. The study of the impact of regulatory and investment 
constraints on financial markets is a complex topic, requiring analysis beyond the scope 
of this work.  This work nonetheless can give a contribution to the discussion on the 
regulation of the investment funds, highlighting how the price pressure generated by 
these funds is additional to the negative influence on the market generated by the index 
fund manager, who has the obligation to sell the junk bond at the time of the index 
rebalancing. The illustrated market effect occurrence is evident when observing our 
results relative to the over-performance of the deleted bonds after the reconstitution of 
the IG indices. In other words, the selling pressure reported around the downgrade 
announcement is followed by a price reversal towards the general matching high yield 
category after the IG benchmark rebalance. 
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Our results offer some practical guidelines for both investment and non-IG 
corporate bonds portfolio managers. First, the positive CARs with respect to the high 
yield category, observed on the following days of the index rebalancing, show the loss 
of value paid by a portfolio anchored to the index construction methodology of the 
underlying benchmark. The impact on the bond prices is attributable to strong 
disinvestments made around the time of the downgrade announcement. Our results 
suggest the opportunity for managers of high yield portfolios to overweigh FAs around 
the day they are removed from the IG benchmarks. Furthermore, our results confirm, 
within the corporate bond indices, the relevance of the findings of Cai and Houdge 
(2008) regarding the index design methodology on the portfolio evaluation. With our 
research we demonstrated that there is a structural incentive for corporate bond portfolio 
managers to drift from their benchmark. Future research should take into account this 
consideration to design more effective market index composition rules.
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Chapter 5: A comparison between Capitalization-
weighted and Equally-weighted indexes in the 
European equity market 
 
 
 
Journal of Asset Management advance online publication, 31 January 2013; 
doi:10.1057/jam.2013.1 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper aims at comparing two major equity index construction methodologies, 
i.e. the capitalization-weighted (CW) and the equally-weighted (EW) approaches. In 
general, the equity benchmarks adopted by mutual funds are CW indexes where the 
components are weighted according to the total market value of their outstanding 
shares. From a theoretical perspective, the wide use of this approach is based on the 
evidence that, under a standard interpretation of the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(Sharpe, 1964), a CW portfolio (the “market” portfolio) is automatically Sharpe Ratio 
maximized.  
Operationally, CW portfolios are easy to be implemented because they offer, at the 
same time, broad diversification and low transaction costs. These operational benefits 
can be justified by the fact that CW portfolios adjust their constituents’ weights 
automatically as market prices move, resulting in fewer rebalancing trades. As a result, 
it is not surprising that asset management companies avoid using benchmarks based on 
a different construction methodology, such as EW indexes for their investment 
products. The EW approach has been criticized mainly because portfolios created using 
this methodology are not representative of the aggregate equity market and this 
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approach treats large and mid-small caps regardless of market liquidity (Arnott et al., 
2005).  
The issue concerning the enhancing of the index construction methodologies is the 
center of academic debate. Critics of CW indexes point out the fact that, basing index 
constituents’ weights on their market capitalization results in the largest securities 
having the biggest weights in the index, so much so that the contribution of smaller-
capitalization securities can be minimal. An increasing number of studies have rejected 
the mean-variance efficiency of CW indexes suggesting alternative index weighting 
methodologies (see Hauger and Baker, 1991; Arnott et al., 2005; Clarke et al., 2006; 
Hsu, 2006; Choueifaty and Coignard, 2008; Chow et al., 2011). These studies base their 
critics on the evidence that cap-weighting tends to overweight those stocks whose prices 
are high in relation to their fundamentals and to underweight stocks which have low 
prices. 
In accordance with Bailey (1992), we believe that the efficacy of the benchmark’s 
choice is mainly related to the context of use. It is worth remembering that the choice of 
the index construction methodology is an increasingly relevant issue due to the 
fundamental role played by the benchmark in the asset management industry. 
Benchmarks have become central to portfolio management with an impact on the 
investment choices, asset allocation, performance measurement and on the evaluation of 
the fund managers reward. The role of the benchmark in the industry is even more 
relevant if we take into consideration the growing role and the impressive amount of 
assets under management of passive investment vehicles such as Exchange Traded 
Funds (ETF).  
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From Perold (2007) we assume that capitalization weighting is associated to a 
momentum strategy while a rebalancing strategy, including equal weighting, is based on 
a contrarian strategy. The momentum strategy12 is based on the empirical evidence that 
stocks with strong past performance continue to outperform stocks with poor past 
performance in the subsequent period (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Being the cap-
weighting a buy-and-hold investment strategy takes advantage of this effect. On the 
other hand, a contrarian strategy is based on the attempts to profit by going against the 
trend selling of the stocks that have shown higher returns and buying the 
underperforming stocks. The EW methodology implicitly follows a contrarian strategy 
because it mechanically rebalances away from stocks that increase in price. Dash and 
Loggie (2008) compare the two approaches focusing on the performance of both the 
S&P500 Index and the S&P500 Equal Weighted Index between 2003-2008. They 
provide empirical evidence of the EW index outperformance as a result of different 
weighting and rebalancing processes. With further research, Dash and Zeng (2010) 
show the same results related to an international index, the S&P International 700 which 
is comprised of 700 of the largest, most liquid stocks from outside the United States.      
 Focusing on the stock market of the Euro area, this paper aims to compare the 
performance of portfolios constructed using the CW and EW approaches over the period 
between January 2002 and December 2011. Our study examines the indexes of the Euro 
equity market since the literature on this topic has focused only on the U.S. market13. 
The comparison between capitalization-weighted and equally-weighted portfolios in the 
Euro area is particularly relevant when we consider the importance of passive 
investment products (such as ETFs) in the fund management industry. These funds 
                                                            
12 See Swinkels (2004) for a survey on momentum investing. 
13 European data are also used by Hemminki and Puttonen (2008) in their study on the benefits of 
fundamental indexation. 
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simply mirror the underlying equity market indexes which are cap-weighted. We 
selected for our analysis the Dow Jones EuroStoxx Index (DJ EURO) and the Dow 
Jones EuroStoxx 50 Index (DJ EURO50) because they are the underlying assets of the 
largest ETF specialized in the Euro equity market, the IShare funds14.    
Furthermore, we examined the DJ EURO50 which is a highly concentrated index 
(representative of the 50 largest stocks in the Euro area) and widely used as benchmark 
by mutual funds. Among the US equity market indexes, there is not an index showing 
such characteristics, namely high concentration of members and market weighted. In 
this study, we examine the large cap index together with the DJ EURO (whose members 
are about 300) as they are the mainly used stock market indexes denominated in Euro15.  
 In this study, we construct EW portfolios using four reweighting frequencies: 
monthly, quarterly, semiannually and annually. Widening the existing literature on this 
topic, we test alternative reweighting frequencies in order to identify the one able to 
maximize the benefits of the contrarian strategy, which is implicit in the EW 
methodology. The results reveal a superior performance of the EW portfolios in each 
reweighting time frame we test and for both the indexes examined. This finding 
suggests that the contrarian effect derived from the stocks reweighting, is stronger than 
the momentum effect, characterizing CW portfolios. Furthermore, we rely on Fama-
French (1992)three-factor regression analysis, we examine the extent to which the 
difference in performance of the two methodologies can be explained by the size and/or 
the style biases. We then proceed with a further analysis focused on the “size effect” but 
                                                            
14 According to the statistics provided by Blackrock, in 2011 the market share of the IShares products in 
Europe, within the category of ETFs, was 70%. Moreover, in December 2011, the assets under 
management by the IShares in Europe were € 105.9 billion. 
15 The DJ EuroStoxx and the DJ EuroStoxx 50 are composed only by stocks denominated in Euro. This 
restriction allows a comparison of the two index construction methodologies without having to consider 
the trend of the exchange rates (primarily the EUR/GBP). 
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based on a portfolio approach. We construct quintile-based portfolios sorting all the 
index members by market capitalization and calculate the excess returns of the top and 
the bottom quintiles over the CW indexes. Next, we test the presence of a stock return 
seasonality and, in particular, of the “January size effect” (see Schwert, 1983 for a 
survey).  
 A frequent criticism of the EW methodology is related to the transaction costs due 
to the higher portfolio turnover. We then calculate the impact of the indexes reweighting  
with respect to a passive investment strategy.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
research methodology. Section 3 presents our main empirical results. Section 4 
comprises some final remarks and concludes the paper. 
  
2. Data and methodology 
 In order to compare the two index construction methodologies, we create EW 
portfolios using a sample of stocks of the Eurozone. This sample includes all the stocks 
that have been constituents of the DJEURO index and of the DJEURO50 index during 
the observation period. In particular, the DJEURO index is composed by a variable 
number of constituents (approximately 300) and it is weighted by free float market 
capitalisation reviewed quarterly. The DJEURO50 index is a blue chip index and covers 
the 50 largest components of the broader DJEURO index. As we discuss later in the 
paper, the analysis of this blue chip index overcome the problem of the well-known 
“size effect” that emerges when different portfolios are compared. We focus on the time 
period from January 2002 to December 2011. The starting date of the observation 
period coincides with the availability of the index constituents provided by Bloomberg 
Finance L.P. which is the data set used in this study. We construct EW portfolios with 
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the constituents of the two DJ indexes but by giving equal weights. More in detail, we 
construct four EW indexes associated with both the market indexes using different 
reweighting frequencies (monthly, quarterly, semiannually and annually). Each 
rebalancing day, the weight of each constituent is set to 1/N percent whereas N is the 
number of constituents in the indexes. The index reweighting is made on the first 
trading day after the end of the observation period in order to avoid illiquidity problems, 
characterizing the last trading day of the year.  
 In our analysis, we assess the return and the risk properties of our EW portfolios 
and of the market indexes. We derive average returns of each portfolio and calculate the 
excess returns of the EW portfolio with respect to the equivalent market index. To 
measure performance, we use total returns which means that returns include dividends 
and distributions realized over the observation period. Next, we calculate the standard 
deviation and the Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio reflects the indexes’ risk/reward 
efficiency by adjusting excess returns over the risk-free interest rate by the volatility 
incurred by the index. As a proxy of the risk-free rate, we use the Euribor rate with 
maturity at 1, 3, 6 and 12 months in accordance with the time frames of the indexes 
reweighing. Next, we calculate the Skewness of return distributions and the drawdown, 
in order to compare the downside risk of each index. 
 In order to examine the risk-adjusted return of the EW indexes we calculate the 
Jensen’s alpha JEN , by running the regression:  
tt
CW
tJENt
EW
t RfRbRfR   )(        (1) 
where 
EW
tR is the return of the EW portfolio, 
CW
tR is the return of the CW index and tRf  
is the return on a risk-free asset. JEN provides an estimate of the risk-adjusted return, 
assuming that b is an appropriate measure for the systematic risk.  
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 The analysis of risk and return measures yield insights into how the indexes behave. 
However, it is also interesting to analyze where the return properties come from. The 
non-cap weighted indexes may take on exposures to common risk factors, such as value, 
momentum and small-cap exposures. Since the indexes are broadly diversified across 
constituent stocks, one may in fact expect that the risk and return properties are largely 
driven by such factor exposures. This leaves only a small fraction of returns that are 
completely specific to the method of index design (Amec et al., 2011). Therefore, in 
order to examine the impact of these risk factors on the difference in performance 
between EW and CW portfolios, we perform a Fama-French (1992) three-factor 
regression analysis:  
tttt
CW
tt
EW
t HMLhSMBsRfRbRfR   )(     (2) 
where EWtR is the return of the EW portfolio, 
CW
tR is the return of the CW index, tRf  is 
the return on a risk-free asset, SMB  is the small-cap factor and HML is the value factor. 
In particular, SMB is a portfolio that is long small cap stocks and short large stocks 
while HML is a portfolio that is long high book-to-price stocks (value stocks) and short 
low book-to-price stocks (growth stocks). In our analysis, the small-cap factor is 
measured by means of the excess return of the S&P small cap Eurozone total return 
index and the DJEURO50 total return index while the value factor is measured as the 
excess return of the S&P Europe EBI Value total index and the S&P Europe EBI 
Growth total index. 
 Afterwards, we proceed with a further analysis which focuses on the “size effect” 
and is based on a different methodology. Following a portfolio approach, we create 
quintile-based portfolios, sorting all the index constituents by ascending market 
capitalization in correspondence of each rebalancing. In particular, we focus on the 
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returns offered by the top and the bottom quintiles portfolios. Therefore, we estimate the 
excess returns over the CW indexes for top and bottom quintiles, as well as the 
difference.    
 Next, we test if the difference in performance between the two portfolios is more 
prevalent in certain month in accordance with the evidence of the size-related anomalies of 
stock returns at the beginning of the year. The January premium for smaller companies is one 
of the best-known academic market anomalies (see Keim 1983). As in Keim (1983), for both 
the indexes analysed, we test the null hypothesis of equal expected abnormal returns for each 
month of the year, we use the following regression: 
t
CW
t
EW
t DaDaDaDaRR   1111332211 ...    (3) 
where 
EW
tR - 
CW
tR is the monthly excess return of the EW portfolio over the CW index 
for month t, and the dummy variables indicate the month of the year in which the excess 
return is observed ( 1D =January, 2D =February, etc.). The excess return for December is 
measured by  , while 1a  through 11a  represent the differences between the excess 
return for December and the excess return for the other months. Afterwards, we perform 
a further regression analysis focused only on the DJEURO index in order to verify if the 
stock return seasonality is due to the “size effect”, rather than to the index construction 
methodology. Therefore, adding the small cap factor SMB  to equation (3), we use the 
following regression:    
tt
CW
t
EW
t SMBDaDaDaDaRR   1111332211 ...    (4) 
Therefore, if the SMB factor is significant, then the seasonality is explained by the “size 
effect”.  
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 Finally, we estimate the rebalancing costs that must be incurred when an EW 
strategy is implemented. In particular, we focus on quarterly reweighting of the 
DJEURO index. In this analysis, we consider two sources of transaction costs. The first 
arises because of the periodic reweighting of the index constituents to the target weigh 
characterizing an EW strategy. In this case, the portfolio turnover is generated by the 
average cross-sectional dispersion of returns of the index’s constituents during the 
observation period: 
 





M
t
t
N
i
EW
t
i
t
M
N
RR
turnover
1
1
       (5) 
where itR is the return the stock i in the quarter t, 
EW
tR is the return of the EW portfolio 
in the quarter t, tN  is the number of the portfolio constituents in the quarter t and M is 
the number of quarters examined (which is equal to 36 in our analysis). The second 
source of transaction costs refers to the loss of the inclusion requirements by the index 
constituents and the subsequent replacement. This occurs mainly when stocks are 
replaced due to their small size or in the case of corporate actions (i.e. M&A and spin-
offs). We calculate this source of turnover as the number of stocks entering and leaving 
the index, at each rebalancing, multiplied by the stocks target weight. Afterwards, we 
average the turnover calculated in each quarter.    
 
3. Empirical Results 
 Table 1 shows the comparison between the returns of the CW indexes (DJEURO 
and DJEURO50) and the equivalent EW version, from January 2002 to December 2011. 
Panel A reports the performance of the DJEURO index and each of its four EW 
versions, constructed using the different reweighting frequencies (monthly, quarterly, 
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semiannually and annually). The results highlight that, for each rebalancing time frame, 
EW portfolios outperform the corresponding CW index whereas the positive excess 
returns are statistically significant based on the t-test. We observe the same findings in 
the comparison between the DJEURO50 index and the corresponding EW portfolios, as 
shown in Panel B. Being that the DJEURO50 is composed only by blue-chips, these 
results prove that the EW methodology provides higher returns with respect to the CW 
one besides any stock’s size consideration. Furthermore, both our analyses show that the 
highest excess returns registered by the EW over the CW indexes are achieved when the 
indexes are rebalanced on a quarterly basis. In this case, the differences in average 
annualized returns between EW and the CW indexes are +3.73% and +2.92% for the 
DJEURO and for the DJEURO50 indexes respectively. The findings suggest that the 
most efficient time frame for the EW index rebalancing is three months. For this reason, 
our further analyses focus only on this reweighting frequency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 92 
Table 1 
This table shows the average returns of the DJ EuroStoxx (DJEURO) and of the DJ EuroStoxx50 
(DJEURO50) indexes and their equally-weighted versions. The statistics are based on a ten-year 
data from 02/01/02 to 31/12/11. Panel A reports the performance of the EW and CW indexes. EW 
indexes are constructed using different reweighting periods: monthly, quarterly, semiannually and 
annually.  
                    
  EW       CW        
Difference 
in average 
EW           
(annualized) 
CW           
(annualized) 
Difference 
in average 
No.        
Obs. 
  
Panel A: DJEURO                 
Monthly 0.26% -0.04% 0.30% ** 3.12% -0.48% 3.60% 120   
Quartely 0.81% -0.12% 0.93% ** 3.25% -0.48% 3.73% 40   
Semiannually 1.50% -0.24% 1.74% ** 3.01% -0.48% 3.49% 20   
Annually 3.12% -0.48% 3.60% * 3.12% -0.48% 3.60% 10   
                    
Panel B: DJEURO50                 
Monthly 0.06% -0.15% 0.21% ** 0.69% -1.82% 2.51% 120   
Quartely 0.27% -0.45% 0.73% ** 1.10% -1.82% 2.92% 40   
Semiannually 0.13% -0.91% 1.04% *** 0.27% -1.82% 2.09% 20   
Annually 0.32% -1.82% 2.14% ** 0.32% -1.82% 2.14% 10   
*     Statistically significant at the 10 percent level  
**   Statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
 Figure 1 displays the performance of the DJEURO and the equivalent EW portfolio 
over the observation period. The cumulative return of the EW portfolio was 38.42% 
compared to -4.70%% of the DJEURO, with a difference equal to 43.12%.  
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Figure 1  
This figure displays the comparison of the cumulative return of the DJ Euro Stoxx index (DJEURO) and 
the equivalent equally-weighted portfolio rebalanced quarterly. The graph covers ten years of data 
from 02/01/02 to 31/12/11. The dataset is provided by Bloomberg Finance L.P. 
 
 
 
Similarly, Figure 2 shows the performance of the DJEURO50 index and its EW version. 
In this case, the cumulative returns of the EW portfolio and of the DJEURO50 index 
were 11.60% and -16.63% respectively, showing a difference equal to 28.23%.     
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Figure 2 
This figure displays the comparison of the cumulative return of the DJ Euro Stoxx 50 index (DJEURO50) 
and the equivalent equally-weighted portfolio rebalanced quarterly. The graph covers ten years of data 
from 02/01/02 to 31/12/11. The dataset is provided by Bloomberg Finance L.P. 
 
 
 Table 2 reports the mean, median, standard deviation and the extreme values of the 
performance difference between the EW portfolios and the stock market indexes 
analyzed in this work. In particular, Panel A is related to the DJEURO index. During the 
sample period, the performance of the market index is positive for 7 out of 10 years. In 
each rebalancing scheme, the over performance of the EW portfolios is predominant 
regardless of the positive or negative performance of the market index. Panel B is 
related to the DJEURO50 index. It’s not surprising that even in this case, the market 
performance is positive, for 6 out of 10 years. Similarly, the over performance of the 
EW is dominant for each reweighing frequency, although smaller than the previous 
case.     
 Table 3 presents the risk and return profile of the analysed portfolios over the 
sample period. The results highlight that EW portfolios show higher standard deviations 
with respect to the related CW indexes. Calculation of the Sharpe ratios yield values of -
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0.064 and -0.091 for the DJEURO index and the DJEURO50 index respectively. On the 
other hand, the equivalent EW portfolios show higher Sharpe ratios equal to +0.014 and 
-0.028 respectively. The Sharpe ratio reflects the indexes’ risk/reward efficiency by 
adjusting excess returns over the risk-free rate by the volatility incurred by the index. In 
this case the CW indexes display lower excess return/volatility ratios than their EW 
versions. All indexes show a negative Skewness meaning that the left tail of the returns 
distribution is more pronounced than the right tail. EW indexes show lower Skewness 
with respect to CW (in particular if we consider the case of the DJEURO) meaning that 
EW portfolios can be considered less risky in the case of extreme negative events. This 
result is explained by the higher diversification of the EW portfolios, able to limit their 
downside risk. 
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Table 2 
This table presents descriptive statistics regarding the difference between the equally-weighted portfolios and the capitalization-weighted indexes (EW-CW). 
Panel A shows the comparison related to the DJ EuroStoxx index (DJEURO) while Panel B is related to the DJ EuroStoxx50 index ((DJEURO50). The statistics 
are based on a ten-year data from 02/01/02 to 31/12/11. EW indexes are constructed using different reweighting periods: monthly, quarterly, semiannually and 
annually. The dataset is provided by Bloomberg Finance L.P. 
                                  
    No. Mean Median SD Min Max       No. Mean Median SD Min Max 
                                  
Panel A: DJEURO               Panel B: DJEURO50             
Monthly:               Monthly:             
  EW-CW>0 74 1.05% 0.89% 0.84% 0.01% 4.45%     EW-CW>0 67 0.80% 0.50% 0.93% 0.03% 4.58% 
  EW-CW<0 46 -0.91% -0.61% 0.79% -2.99% -0.03%     EW-CW<0 53 -0.54% -0.26% 0.76% -3.85% -0.01% 
  EW-CW in case of positive index returns 67 0.32% 0.31% 1.07% -1.86% 4.45%     EW-CW in case of positive index returns 66 0.52% 0.25% 1.07% -0.87% 4.58% 
  EW-CW in case of negative index returns 53 0.27% 0.40% 1.47% -2.99% 3.19%     EW-CW in case of negative index returns 54 -0.17% -0.06% 0.99% -3.85% 2.11% 
Quarterly:               Quarterly:             
  EW-CW>0 28 3.21% 2.07% 5.32% 0.12% 29.33%     EW-CW>0 28 1.50% 1.15% 1.56% 0.05% 7.13% 
  EW-CW<0 12 -2.60% -2.23% 2.28% -8.88% -0.07%     EW-CW<0 12 -1.07% -0.94% 0.85% -3.26% -0.17% 
  EW-CW in case of positive index returns 26 1.04% 1.55% 2.97% -8.88% 5.13%     EW-CW in case of positive index returns 23 1.12% 0.63% 1.92% -0.96% 7.13% 
  EW-CW in case of negative index returns 14 2.26% 0.32% 8.19% -4.18% 29.33%     EW-CW in case of negative index returns 17 0.20% 0.70% 1.58% 2.89% 2.89% 
Semiannually:               Semiannually:             
  EW-CW>0 16 3.06% 2.60% 2.43% 0.08% 7.92%     EW-CW>0 16 1.56% 1.17% 1.25% 0.23% 4.68% 
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  EW-CW<0 4 -3.51% -4.15% 2.50% -5.65% -0.09%     EW-CW<0 4 -1.01% -1.11% 0.49% -1.51% -0.33% 
  EW-CW in case of positive index returns 12 2.35% 1.93% 2.06% 0.08% 7.43%     EW-CW in case of positive index returns 11 0.89% 1.03% 0.83% -1.04% 1.91% 
  EW-CW in case of negative index returns 8 0.84% 1.24% 5.18% -5.65% 7.92%     EW-CW in case of negative index returns 9 1.23% 0.50% 2.17% -1.51% 4.68% 
Annually:               Annually:             
  EW-CW>0 7 6.63% 6.67% 2.38% 2.04% 8.82%     EW-CW>0 8 2.83% 2.74% 1.75% 0.25% 5.28% 
  EW-CW<0 3 -3.46% -3.60% 0.69% -4.07% -2.72%     EW-CW<0 2 -0.62% -0.62% 0.79% -1.18% -0.06% 
  EW-CW in case of positive index returns 7 4.85% 6.14% 4.32% -3.60% 8.79%     EW-CW in case of positive index returns 6 2.54% 2.57% 2.22% -0.06% 5.28% 
  EW-CW in case of negative index returns 3 0.68% -2.72% 7.08% -4.07% 8.82%     EW-CW in case of negative index returns 4 1.53% 1.69% 2.16% -1.18% 3.92% 
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Table 3  
This table shows some performance statistics of the indexes DJ EuroStoxx (DJEURO) and DJ 
EuroStoxx50 (DJEURO50) and their equally-weighted version based on a quarterly reweighting. 
The statistics are based on 40 observations in the ten-year data from 02/01/02 to 31/12/11. 
Significance tests are made for each comparison. In particular, the differences in the statistics are 
tested by the t-test for the average returns, the Fisher test for standard deviations and the Jobson-
Korkie test for the Sharpe ratio.  
              
  
DJEURO     
(EW) 
DJEURO     
(CW) 
DJEURO      
(EW - CW) 
DJEURO50     
(EW) 
DJEURO50     
(CW) 
DJEURO50     
(EW - CW) 
              
Average return 3.25% -0.48% 3.73% 1.10% -1.82% 2.92% 
p-value     0.017     0.015 
Standard deviation 25.01% 23.69% 1.32% 25.73% 23.90% 1.83% 
p-value     0.737     0.647 
Sharpe ratio 0.014 -0.064 0.078 -0.028 -0.091 0.063 
p-value     2.540     2.956 
Skewness -0.811 -0.967   -0.890 -0.970   
              
  
 In order to test the two strategies during negative market phases, we calculate the 
drawdown of each index. The drawdown is the measure of the decline from a historical 
peak of the stock price. We focus on the two bear market phases occurred in our 
observation period: the first includes the interval between 01/01/02 and 01/10/02; the 
second the interval between 01/07/07 and 01/04/09. The results of the drawdown 
analysis are shown in Table 4. The figures highlight conflicting results in the two 
periods examined for the two indexes analysed suggesting that the market direction is 
not an explanatory variable in our comparison.  
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 Table 5 shows the results of the regression analysis performed to calculate the 
Jensen’s alpha. Our finding highlights that EW portfolios have a positive coefficient, 
significantly different from zero.   
Table 4 
This table shows the results of the drawdown analysis on the DJ EuroStoxx (DJEURO) and of the DJ 
EuroStoxx50 (DJEURO50) indexes during two bear market phases within the sample period (02/01/02 - 
31/12/11). The dataset is provided by Bloomberg Finance L.P. 
              
  
DJEURO     
(EW) 
DJEURO     
(CW) 
DJEURO      
(EW - CW) 
DJEURO50     
(EW) 
DJE+G16URO50   
(CW) 
DJEURO50     
(EW - CW) 
              
01/2002 - 10/2002 -31.1% -36.4% 5.3% -39.2% -38.6% -0.6% 
07/2007 - 04/2009 -56.2% -53.4% -2.8% -49.3% -51.0% 1.7% 
              
  
Table 5 
This table shows summary statistics for the Jensen’s alpha. Tests are performed on DJ EuroStoxx 
(DJEURO) and DJ EuroStoxx50 (DJEURO50) indexes. The statistics are based on a ten-year data 
from 02/01/02 to 31/12/11. The construction of the EW portfolios is based on a quarterly 
reweighting. Regressions with Newey-West standard errors. 
            
  
             α   
  b   
No.          
Observations 
            
DJEURO 1.013 ** 1.057 *** 40 
t-value (2.685)   (31.51)     
            
 DJEURO50 0.867 *** 1.076 *** 40 
t-value (3.039)   (42.76)     
            
 *    Statistically significant at the 10 percent level     
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**   Statistically significant at the 5 percent level     
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level     
  
 Table 6 shows the results of the regression analysis based on the three-factor model 
of Fama and French (1992), aimed to capture the size bias by means of the SMB factor 
(small stocks minus large stocks) and the style bias by means of the HML factor (value 
stocks minus growth stocks). The findings reveal that EW portfolios have a highly 
significant size bias in the case of the DJEURO which is composed by roughly 300 
stocks. This result confirms previous findings providing strong empirical support that 
allows to assert that EW indexes tilt toward smaller-cap securities to a statistically 
significant level (see Velvadapu, 2011). Over the 2002-2011 period, the SMB 
coefficient is 0.298 for the EW version of the DJEURO. In the case of the DJEURO50 
the regression analysis should not reveal any size bias. Actually, we find a negative 
coefficient of the SMB factor, statistically significant at 10% level. This result indicates 
that the EW index tilts toward large-cap securities, but this is not a reasonable assertion. 
Moreover, focusing on the style factor, we find that both the indexes exhibit a value tilt 
over the ten-year period: the HML coefficients are 0.320 and 0.216 for the EW version 
of the DJEURO and the DJEURO50 indexes respectively. This result confirms the 
findings of Arnott et al. (2005) demonstrating that CW indexes tilt toward growth 
securities.  
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Table 6 
This table shows summary statistics for the three-factor model. Tests are performed on DJ 
EuroStoxx (DJEURO) and DJ EuroStoxx50 (DJEURO50) indexes. The parameter s is related to 
the size factor SMB while the parameter h is related to the style factor HML. The statistics are 
based on a ten-year data from 02/01/02 to 31/12/11. The construction of the EW portfolios is based 
on a quarterly reweighting. The dataset is provided by Bloomberg Finance L.P. Regressions with 
Newey-West standard errors. 
                    
  
              α 
  b   s   h   
No.        
Observations 
                    
DJEURO 0.704 ** 1.053 *** 0.298 *** 0.320 *** 40 
t-value (2.200)   (48.03)   (4.055)   (4.591)     
                    
 DJEURO50 0.715 *** 1.041 *** -0.359 *** 0.200 *** 40 
t-value (3.290)   (63.246)   (-6.604)   (4.011)     
                    
 *    Statistically significant at the 10 percent level           
**   Statistically significant at the 5 percent level           
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level           
 
 Table 7 presents the results of our further analysis, based on a portfolio approach, 
aimed to verify if the stock’s size is able to explain the over performance of the EW 
portfolios. Our results confirm highly significant excess returns over the CW indexes of 
the equivalent EW portfolios based on a quarterly reweighting frequency: +1.02% and 
+0.84% for the DJEURO and the DJEURO50 respectively. On the other hand, the TOP 
and BOTTOM quintile-based portfolios do not exhibit statistically significant excess 
returns over the CW indexes. Also the comparison between the BOTTOM and TOP 
portfolios do not provide significant results. The findings offer additional evidence to 
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the fact that the stock’s size is not able to fully explain the excess returns of the EW 
portfolios over the equivalent CW indexes. 
Table 7 
This table shows the results of the analysis based on the portfolio approach. Excess returns are 
calculated over the CW indexes (DJ EuroStoxx and DJ EuroStoxx50) for EW portfolios 
(EWmCW), for top quintile portfolios (TOPmCW) and for bottom quintile portfolios (BTMmCW).  
Excess returns are also calculated between top and bottom quintile portfolios (TOPmBTM). The 
statistics are based on a ten-year data from 02/01/02 to 31/12/11. The construction of the portfolios 
is based on a quarterly reweighting. The dataset is provided by Bloomberg Finance L.P. 
                    
  EWmCW TOPmCW BTMmCW TOPmBTM 
No.        
Observations 
                    
DJEURO 1.02% *** -0.07%   1.62% * -1.69%   40 
t-value (2.645)   (-0.293)   (1.878)   (-1.595)     
                    
 DJEURO50 0.84% *** -0.36%   1.50%   -1.87%   40 
t-value (2.68)   (-0.592)   (1.386)   (-1.242)     
                    
 *    Statistically significant at the 10 percent level             
**   Statistically significant at the 5 percent level             
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level             
 
 Table 8 shows the results of the analysis designed to examine if the excess returns 
of the EW portfolios presents a seasonality (Panel A) and if the stock return anomaly is 
explained by the “size effect” (Panel B). Not surprisingly, we find that highly 
significant excess returns occur in January, but only for the DJEURO. According to the 
prevalent literature on this issue, we provide evidence of the “January size effect” being 
both a positive and highly significant coefficient of the SMB factor (Panel B).   
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 From an operational point of view, the excess return showed by the EW portfolios 
must be analysed in the light of the higher transaction costs associated with the EW 
strategy. Focusing on the DJEURO index reweighted quarterly, we estimate two sources 
of trading costs: the turnover related to the periodic index constituents reweighting and 
the turnover associated with the index stocks replacement. The first is, on average, equal 
to 10.51% while the second is equal to 5.04% on a quarterly basis. This statistic is in 
line with those of Dash and Zeng (2010), who argue that generally the US equity 
indexes have a turnover in the 15% to 30% range. Relying on the S&P500 index, during 
the five years period, ending in 2009, the average turnover of the equivalent EW index 
(also rebalanced quarterly) was 28.1%. In this case of the DJEURO index, if we assume 
negotiation fees of 10 bps16 for stock trading, the average transaction costs are limited to 
nearly 6 bps per year.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 This paper compares two alternative index design methodologies, i.e. the equally-
weighted and the cap-weighted. It focuses on the Euro equity market rather than the 
more frequently studied US equity market. Our research provides further evidence to 
the established literature on this topic of the benefits of equal weighting over the market 
weighting methodology. We highlight the fact that the highest excess return amongst 
those observed is associated with the quarterly rebalancing of the EW portfolios.  
 Our findings demonstrate that the “January size effect” is not the only explanatory 
variable of the difference in performance obtained using the two approaches. The 
benefit which results from reweighting the portfolio into equal weights can rather be 
                                                            
16 A negotiation fee equal to 10bps for stock trading is relatively high for institutional investors. Our 
conservative assumption allows considering the possible additional transaction costs arising from the bid-
ask spread characterizing smaller cap stocks.  
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attributed to the fact that EW portfolios implicitly follow a contrarian investment 
strategy, because they mechanically rebalance away from stocks that increase in price. 
According to this strategy, overvalued stocks are sold at each rebalancing, preventing 
the continued growth of their weight during financial bubbles. These findings are 
extremely important if we consider that, usually, the benchmarks used in the asset 
management industry are based on cap-weighting. Moreover, EW indexes permit a 
higher diversification of the portfolio by investing a higher proportion of the 
portfolio in mid- or small-cap stocks. Finally, we calculate the amount of transaction 
costs related to the EW portfolios examined in our analyses.  
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Table 8 
This table shows the results of the analysis month-by-month of the average excess returns of the equally-weighted portfolios of the DJ EuroStoxx and DJ 
EuroStoxx50 over the market-weighted indexes. Panel A presents the results of the regression analysis focused on the stock return seasonality for both the 
indexes. Panel B presents the results of the regression analysis performed in order to verify the January size effect. The statistics are based on a ten-year data 
from 02/01/02 to 31/12/11. The dataset is provided by Bloomberg Finance L.P. 
                                                  
  January February March April May June July August September October November SMB 
                                                  
Panel A                                                 
                                                  
DJEURO 0.0152 *** 0.00685   0.01068 ** 0.0127 ** 0.00457   -0.0013   0.00473   0.00429   -0.002   -0.0009   -0.0007       
t-value (2.924)   (1.313)   (2.048)   (2.435)   (0.876)   (-0.252)   (0.9073)   (0.823)   (-0.390)   (-0.168)   (-0.143)       
                                                  
DJEURO50 0.0012   -0.0026   0.00307   0.0093 * 0.00143   -0.0041   0.00226   -0.0015   -0.0053   -0.0027   0.0016       
t-value (0.241)   (-0.527)   (0.620)   (1.876)   (0.288)   (-0.826)   (0.455)   (-0.311)   (-1.062)   (-0.553)   (0.325)       
                                                  
Panel B                                                 
                                                  
DJEURO 0.00246   -0.0019   0.00489   0.00654   0.00082   -0.0035   0.0013   0.00036   -0.0035   0.00032   -0.0004   0.3751   
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t-value (0.675)   (-0.522)   (1.390)   (1.856) * (0.235)   (-0.999)   (0.372)   (0.102)   (-1.017)   (0.093)   (-0.121)   (11.631) *** 
                                                  
                                                  
 *    Statistically significant at the 10 percent level                                         
**   Statistically significant at the 5 percent level                                         
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level                                         
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Disclaimer 
STOXX Limited (“STOXX”) is the source of the Dow Jones EuroStoxx Index and the Dow Jones 
EuroStoxx 50 Index and STOXX or its third party data providers are the source of the data 
comprised therein. Neither STOXX nor its third party data providers have been involved in any 
way in the creation of any reported information and they neither warrant nor assume any liability 
whatsoever – including without limitation the accuracy, adequateness, correctness, completeness, 
timeliness, and fitness for any purpose – with respect to any reported information. Any 
dissemination or further distribution of any such information pertaining to STOXX is prohibited. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 In this work we studied the efficiency of the benchmarks used in the asset management 
industry, with a focus on the difference between capitalization weighted indexes and alternative 
weighted methods. 
 In chapter 2 we analyzed the efficiency of the benchmark used for the government bond 
markets. We found that for the Emerging Market Bonds an equally weighted index for the country 
weights is probably the more suited because guarantees maximum diversification of country risk 
and in the long run has a better Sharpe ratio than a capitalization weighted index. For the Eurozone 
government bond market we found a GDP weighted index is better because the most important 
matter is to avoid a higher weight for highly indebted countries. 
 In chapter 3 we analyzed the efficiency of a Derivatives Index to invest in the European 
corporate bond market instead of a Cash Index. We can state that the two indexes are similar in 
terms of returns, but that the Derivatives Index is less risky because it has a lower volatility, has 
values of skewness and kurtosis closer to those of a normal distribution and is a more liquid 
instrument, as the autocorrelation is not significant. The capitalization method used for the ML 
Index (in contrast to the equal weighting method used for the Derivatives Index) also has risks 
related to changes in the weights over time, in particular when a sector or an issuer has a high 
weight because it is highly indebted, as has been experienced by the financial sector recently. 
 In chapter 4 it is analyzed the impact of fallen angels on the corporate bond portfolios, with the 
rules of the benchmark indexes which can determine a loss of value for the investors. Our analysis 
investigated the impact of the month-end rebalancing of the ML Emu Non Financial Corporate 
Index for the exit of downgraded bond (the event). In this case, we found a statistically significant 
negative CAR of -5.00% in the pre-event window (-30; -1). Moreover, we did not report a 
significant CAR in the event window (-1;+1): the reason is that the index rebalancing rules are 
known in advance, hence the bond’s deletion from the index does not have any short term impact on 
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their prices. Furthermore, we found positive and statistically significant CARs of +1.12%, +1.91% 
and +1.59% in the post-event windows respectively (+1; +5), (+1; +10) and (+1; +15). We can 
conclude a flexible approach to the month-end rebalancing is better in order to avoid a loss of 
valued due to the benchmark construction rules. 
 In chapter 5 we did a comparison between the equally weighted and capitalization weighted 
method for the European equity market. The benefit which results from reweighting the portfolio 
into equal weights can be attributed to the fact that EW portfolios implicitly follow a contrarian 
investment strategy, because they mechanically rebalance away from stocks that increase in price. 
According to this strategy, overvalued stocks are sold at each rebalancing, preventing the continued 
growth of their weight during financial bubbles. Moreover, EW indexes permit a higher 
diversification of the portfolio by investing a higher proportion of the portfolio in mid- or small-cap 
stocks.  
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